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MASS FILE SHARING LAWSUITS:
LEGALIZED EXTORTION ORVALID
DEFENSE OF COPYRIGHT?
Tyler Tassone*
Since the days ofNapster, peer to peer (P2P) file sharing has become
ubiquitous and has ushered in an era of rampant digital piracy. 1 The most
popular P2P file sharing protocol, BitTorrent, is the second-largest consumer of bandwidth in North America, consuming 21.6 percent of all
internet traffic over a twenty-four hour period. 2 It has been reported that
BitTorrent has over 100 million monthly users from over 220 countries,
surpassing the monthly usage of both Hulu and Netflix, estimated at 30
million and 16.9 million monthly users respectively. 3
Despite having various legal uses, P2P file sharing is commonly
used to distribute copyrighted materials, movies, and music in particular,
and is the basis of countless copyright infringement lawsuits. 4 Copyright
* Villanova University School of Law, J.D. 2013; University of Virginia,
B.S. 2010.
1
See Matthew Lasar, Sailors Beware: P2P Piracy Will Sink Your Jobs by
2015, A.Rs TECHNICA (Mar. 22, 2010, 11:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2010/03/sailors-beware-p2p-piracy-will-sink-your-jobs-by-2015 .ars
(identifying P2P file-sharing as primary avenue for piracy).
2
See Geoff Gasior, Netflix Unseats BitTorrent as Internet Traffic King, THE
TECH REPORT (May 18, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://techreport.com/discussions.x/20969
(noting that BitTorrent is second only to Netflix in consumption of internet bandwidth
over twenty-four hour periods, with Netflix ahead by only 0.6 percent).
3
See Ernesto, UTorrent & BitTorrent Hit JOO Million Monthly Users,
TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 3, 2011 ), http://torrentfreak.com/utorrent-bittorrent-hit-100million-monthly-users-110103/ (announcing that BitTorrent' s two biggest clients,
BitTorrent Mainline client and uTorrent, have combined number of users in excess of
100 million); see also Austin Carr, BitTorrent Has More Users Than Netjlix and Hulu
Combined- and Doubled (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://www.fastcompany.com/1714001/bittorrent-swells-to-100-million-users (comparing number of monthly BitTorrent users to other popular internet media outlets).
4
See Mark F. Schultz, Will BitTorrent Go the Way ofGrokster? File Sharing After MGM v. Grokster, A.B.A. ScITECH LA WYER, Winter 2006, 4, 5 (reporting
BitTorrent is used for distribution of copies of Linux, authorized file sharing of concert recordings, and distribution of products by video game producers); see also Seth
Schiesel, File Sharing's New Face: A More Efficient Swapping System Finds Uses
Beyond Its Creator's Control, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004), at GI, available at
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holders in the movie industry, attributing declining revenues at the box
office and in DVD sales to digital piracy, have responded by filing suit
against hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of defendants that allegedly participated in P2P file-sharing of copyrighted materials. 5 As of
August 2011, over 200,000 internet users across the United States have
been targeted in mass file sharing lawsuits. 6
In one of the largest file sharing lawsuits, Voltage Pictures, LLC. v.
Does 1-5000, the copyright holders of the Academy Award winning
film, "The Hurt Locker" sued 5000 "John Doe" defendants, identified
only by their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, for illegally downloading
and distributing the film using BitTorrent. 7 The copyright holders issued
subpoenas to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) seeking the identifying
information of the person behind each IP address. 8 In these mass file
sharing lawsuits, once the copyright holders obtain the defendants' identifying information through discovery, the copyright holders typically
offer the defendants settlements of two to three thousand dollars each. 9
Defendan!s overwhelmingly choose to accept the settlement offers in
lieu of proceeding to trial and facing legal fees and, potentially, penalties

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/technology/file-sharing-s-newface.html?src=pm (explaining motivation ofBitTorrent's creator, Bram Cohen, for
creating BitTorrent file sharing protocol: downloading files rapidly by making better
use of available bandwidth).
5
See Kevin Parrish, 'Hurt Locker' Studio Now Suing Nearly 50K Pirates,
ToM's GUIDE (May 24, 2011, 6:50 PM), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/The-hurtLocker-Voltage-Pictures-Copyright-lnfringement-BitTorrent-USCG,news11307 .html (indicating that "Hurt Locker" earned merely seventeen million dollars
from box office revenue); see also Jon Healey, File Sharing: To Fight or Accommodate?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-healey 1aprO1,0,2014471. story (describing how DVD sales have leveled off after years of growth).
6
See Ernesto, 200,000 BitTorrent Users Sued in the United States,
TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 8, 2011 ), http://torrentfreak.com/200000-bittorrent-users-suedin-the-united-states-110808/ (declaring that over 200,000 BitTorrent John Does have
been sued since 2010).
7
See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011
WL 1807438, at *1 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (providing background information about
Voltage's file sharing lawsuit against anonymous users).
8
See Greg Sandoval, 'Hurt Locker' Downloaders, You've Been Sued,
CNETNEWS (May 28, 2010, 12:19 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_320006314-261.html (noting that due to large requests for identifying information,
ISP's have complained that they do not have resources to track down so many defendants).
9
See Julianne Pepitone, 50,000 BitTorrent Users Sued for Alleged Illegal
Downloads, CNN MONEY (June 10, 2011, 3:59 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/1 O/technology/bittorrent_lawsuits/index.htm (offering
defendants settlements of $1500 to $2500 to avoid litigation).
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up to the statutory limit of$150,000. 10 The risk of extraordinary damages being rendered against a defendant file-sharer is supported by P2P file
sharing case law, and in one case a verdict of $675,000, later remitted to
$67,500, was rendered against a P2P file-sharer. 11
Critics have referred to the mass lawsuits as judicially sponsored
"extortion," noting the copyright holders' strategy of coercing defendants to pay small settlements rather than risk facing relatively larger penalties at trial. 12 Other commentators have derisively referred to the file
sharing lawsuits as "fishing expedition[s]" because copyright holders
seek to discover identifying information of defendants to facilitate settlements based on limited evidence of defendants' engagement in infringing activity, namely the defendants' IP addresses. 13
The mass P2P file sharing lawsuits raise procedural questions for the
district courts overseeing these cases, notably, whether to allow joinder
of all defendants in one suit and whether the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction should be assessed before or after defendants are named in
the suit. 14 With no guidance from appellate courts squarely addressing
10
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 2005) (limiting statutory damages to
$150,000 per infringed work, where plaintiff sustains burden of proving that defendants willfully infringed copyright). See Pepitone, supra note 9 (collecting views of
critics who say Voltage's suit is exploitative of copyright law, and referring to litigation as employing "pay up or we'll getcha" method).
11
See Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 89 (D.
Mass. 2010) (remitting damages awarded by jury to $2250 per infringed work, or
three times the statutory minimum, since original damage award was grossly excessive in violation of Due Process), rev'd, Nos. 10-1883, 10-1947, 10-2052, 2011 WL
4133920 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 2011):
12
See Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, 'Hurt Locker' Lawsuit Targets 24,583 BitTorrent Users, PC WORLD (May 24, 2011, 8:07 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/228519/hurt_locker_lawsuit_targets_24583_bittorren
t_users.html (criticizing the US Copyright Group for engaging in extortion because
they have no intention of suing users and simply wish to collect settlements); see also
Emil Protalinski, Torrent Users Sue US Copyright Group for Fraud and Extortion,
TECHSPOT (Nov. 29, 2010, 3:21 PM), http://www.techspot.com/news/41341-torrentusers-sue-us-copyright-group-for-fraud-and-extortion.html (describing torrent users'
lawsuit, alleging fraud and extortion, against a law firm that represented USCG in
file-sharing lawsuit).
13
See Nate Anderson, Judge: P2P Class-Action Suit Looks Like a "Fishing
Expedition," A.Rs TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2011, 11 :43 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2011 /03/judge-p2p-class-action-suit-looks-like-a-fishing-expedition.ars
(quoting judge who referred to mass file- sharing lawsuits as "fishing expedition[s]");
see also Nate Anderson, Hurt by the Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses Aren't Enough
to Find File-Swappers, A.Rs TECHNICA (Aug. 26, 2011, 12:37 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-findfile-swappers.ars (explaining that IP addresses do not provide specific evidence of
who committed infringement).
14
For a further discussion of procedural challenges raised by defendants in
P2P file-sharing lawsuits, see infra notes 89-116 and accompanying text.
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See 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 2005) (limiting statutory damages to
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the procedural issues raised by John Doe P2P lawsuits, courts have responded to these questions in largely dissimilar ways; the differences
significantly affect the defendants' privacy rights as well as copyright
holders' ability to protect their copyrights. 15
Part I will discuss BitTorrent's P2P architecture, how it works, and
its ramifications regarding copyright infringement. 16 Part II details the
different ways in which copyright holders can obtain identifying information of anonymous users of P2P networks suspected of engaging in
infringing activity. 17 Part ill examines how courts have resolved the procedural issues raised by the John Doe defendants, such as whether joinder is proper, whether there is personal jurisdiction, and whether these
issues should be addressed before or after the identification of the Doe
defendants. 18 District courts disagree on whether hundreds or even thousands of John Does can be joined in a single suit. 19 To a lesser extent,
courts disagree on when and how to address personal jurisdiction in
these cases. 20 Part IV will present an argument for how courts should
resolve the procedural issues raised by these cases. 21 Finally, Part V will
place the mass file sharing lawsuits in context for future analysis of how
courts should address copyright infringement via P2P networks. 22

I. PIRACYVIAP2PNETWORKS
The development ofNapster marked the beginning of the age of P2P
file sharing. 23 A P2P network is one in which a user can distribute files

15

For a further discussion of the various approaches district courts have
taken to assessing procedural issues in John Doe file-sharing lawsuits, see infra notes
89-167 and accompanying text.
16
For a further discussion of P2P networks, see infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
17
For a further discussion of how copyright holders identify anonymous
users engaging in infringing activity, see infra notes 52-88 and accompanying text.
18
For a further discussion of copyright infringement suits against John Does
who downloaded copyrighted films using P2P networks, and the attendant procedural
issues, see infra notes 89-167 and accompanying text.
19
For a further discussion of the propriety of joinder of John Doe defendants,
see infra notes 140-167 and accompanying text.
2
For a .further discussion of defenses raised by John Does regarding personal jurisdiction, see infra notes 117-13 9 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 168-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying
text.
22
See infra notes 223-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying
text.
23
See In re Charter Commc'ns, 393 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2005) (''Napster
was the first and most notorious P2P system."); see also Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL.
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directly from his computer to another user, or peer. 24 P2P file sharing
differs from traditional file sharing protocols that are based on clientserver architecture in which a central computer, called a server, sends
data out to individual users or clients. 25 Client-server file transfer protocol suffers the limitation of slowing download speed to clients as more
clients request information from the central server; this drawback served
as an incentive to develop alternative file sharing protocol. 26
Napster, employing P2P architecture, diverged from traditional client-server architectures in that Napster users would not request a file
from a central server, but would simply ~equest a file from another user. 27 Despite employing P2P architecture, the parent corporation ofNapster still maintained a centralized server to store copies of the files users
requested, making the parent corporation an easy target for copyright
holders' infringement suits. 28 For this reason, the central server proved to
be N apster' s Achilles heel, subjecting the parent corporation to vicarious
and contributory infringement and ultimately leading to the demise of
N apster as a company and as a piracy hub. 29
After Napster's downfall, new P2P file sharing networks began to
develop that avoided Napster' s flaw of relying on centralized servers. 30
Decentralized networks, such as Grokster andBitTorrent, allow individual users to send information directly to one another without using a

L. REv. 1049, 1055 (2008) (recognizing that music downloading dramatically increased upon Napster's inception).
24
See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 276 F.R.D.
241, 244 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (contrasting P2P network architecture with client-server
architecture in which any given user communicates with one central computer server
containing all files or information).
25
See id. (detailing how BitTorrent works).
26
See id. (explaining that, in client-server architecture, reliable access to data
is dependent upon a server's ability to operate continuously under high volumes of
simultaneous requests from clients).
27
See In re Charter Commc'ns, 393 F.3d at 773 (distinguishing Napster's
architecture from client-server architecture).
28
See id. (maintaining central server with copies of files distributed by
peers); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir.
2001) (describing how parent corporation's publishing of available files facilitated
infringement by the program's users).
29
See A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1024 (holding Napster contributorily
and vicariously liable for copyright infringement due to its failure to police its premises and its central server, and for deriving financial benefit).
30
See Vincent J. Galluzzo, When "Now Known or Later Developed" Fails
its Purpose: How P2P Litigation Has Turned the Distribution Right Upside-Down, 61
FLA. L. REv. 1165, 1175 (2009) (observing that software developers designed new
P2P architecture that did not require centralized servers, facilitating avoidance of
contributory and vicarious liability).

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

334

[Vol. 3:2]

the procedural issues raised by John Doe P2P lawsuits, courts have responded to these questions in largely dissimilar ways; the differences
significantly affect the defendants' privacy rights as well as copyright
15
holders' ability to protect their copyrights.
Part I will discuss BitTorrent's P2P architecture, how it works, and
16
its ramifications regarding copyright infringement. Part II details the
different ways in which copyright holders can obtain identifying information of anonymous users of P2P networks suspected of engaging in
infringing activity. 17 Part ill examines how courts have resolved the procedural issues raised by the John Doe defendants, such as whether joinder is proper, whether there is personal jurisdiction, and whether these
issues should be addressed before or after the identification of the Doe
defendants. 18 District courts disagree on whether hundreds or even thou19
sands of John Does can be joined in a single suit. To a lesser extent,
courts disagree on when and how to address personal jurisdiction in
these cases. 20 Part IV will present an argument for how courts should
21
resolve the procedural issues raised by these cases. Finally, Part V will
place the mass file sharing lawsuits in context for future analysis of how
22
courts should address copyright infringement via P2P networks.

I. PIRACYVIAP2PNETWORKS
The development ofNapster marked the beginning of the age of P2P
file sharing. 23 A P2P network is one in which a user can distribute files

15

For a further discussion of the various approaches district courts have
taken to assessing procedural issues in John Doe file-sharing lawsuits, see infra notes
89-167 and accompanying text.
16
For a further discussion of P2P networks, see infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
17
For a further discussion of how copyright holders identify anonymous
users engaging in infringing activity, see infra notes 52-88 and accompanying text.
18
For a further discussion of copyright infringement suits against John Does
who downloaded copyrighted films using P2P networks, and the attendant procedural
issues, see infra notes 89-167 and accompanying text.
19
For a further discussion of the propriety of joinder of John Doe defendants,
see infra notes 140-167 and accompanying text.
2
For a-further discussion of defenses raised by John Does regarding personal jurisdiction, see infra notes 117-139 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 168-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying
text.
22
See infra notes 223-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying
text.
23
See In re Charter Commc'ns, 393 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2005) (''Napster
was the first and most notorious P2P system."); see also Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TuL.

°

MASS FILE SHARING LAWSUITS

335

directly from his computer to another user, or peer. 24 P2P file sharing
differs from traditional file sharing protocols that are based on clientserver architecture in which a central computer, called a server, sends
data out to individual users or clients. 25 Client-server file transfer protocol suffers the limitation of slowing download speed to clients as more
clients request information from the central server; this drawback served
as an incentive to develop alternative file sharing protocol. 26
Napster, employing P2P architecture, diverged from traditional client-server architectures in that Napster users would not request a file
from a central server, but would simply ~equest a file from another user. 27 Despite employing P2P architecture, the parent corporation ofNapster still maintained a centralized server to store copies of the files users
requested, making the parent corporation an easy target for copyright
holders' infringement suits. 28 For this reason, the central server proved to
be N apster' s Achilles heel, subjecting the parent corporation to vicarious
and contributory infringement and ultimately leading to the demise of
Napster as a company and as a piracy hub. 29
After Napster's downfall, new P2P file sharing networks began to
develop that avoided Napster' s flaw of relying on centralized servers. 30
Decentralized networks, such as Grokster and BitT orrent, allow individual users to send information directly to one another without using a

L. REV. 1049, 1055 (2008) (recognizing that music downloading dramatically increased upon Napster's inception).
24
See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 276 F.R.D.
241, 244 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (contrasting P2P network architecture with client-server
architecture in which any given user communicates with one central computer server
containing all files or information).
25
See id. (detailing how BitTorrent works).
26
See id. (explaining that, in client-server architecture, reliable access to data
is dependent upon a server's ability to operate continuously under high volumes of
simultaneous requests from clients).
27
See In re Charter Commc'ns, 393 F.3d at 773 (distinguishing Napster's
architecture from client-server architecture).
28
See id. (maintaining central server with copies of files distributed by
peers); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir.
2001) (describing how parent corporation's publishing of available files facilitated
infringement by the program's users).
29
See A&M Records, Inc., 239 F .3d at 1024 (holding Napster contributorily
and vicariously liable for copyright infringement due to its failure to police its premises and its central server, and for deriving financial benefit).
30
See Vincent J. Galluzzo, When "Now Known or Later Developed" Fails
its Purpose: How P2P Litigation Has Turned the Distribution Right Upside-Down, 61
FLA. L. REv. 1165, 117 5 (2009) (observing that software developers designed new
P2P architecture that did not require centralized servers, facilitating avoidance of
contributory and vicarious liability).

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

336

[Vol. 3:2]

central server to store and transmit data to or from users. 31 Instead, BitTorrent uses its servers as "trackers," to store lists describing "swarms,"
which are groups of individual users involved in downloading and distributing particular files. 32 Swarms can last for several days or even several weeks depending on the popularity of the file being shared. 33
For a BitTorrent user to engage in file sharing, a peer connects to a
tracker to find a swarm to download a particular file. 34 Once a user locates a swarm, the user downloads small pieces of the file from several
other users, rather than downloading the file in its entirety from a single
user or a central server. 35 In this way, BitTorrent makes efficient use of
bandwidth and allows users to download files at higher speeds as the
number of peers in the swarm increases. 36 Lastly, once a user downloads
a particular file, the user automatically becomes a source for future users
to download the same file. 37 As a result, BitTorrent file sharing protocol
makes it impossible for any user to receive files without also sharing
files. 38
BitTorrent' s decentralized nature insulates it from traditional antipiracy measures. 39 Actions to enjoin the central server from unlawfully
31

See Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG,
2011WL3100404, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (allowing individual users to
exchange data with one another anonymously).
32
See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011 WL
3498227, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (describing the use of a tracker to help peers
locate one another and noting that trackers do not participate directly in data transfer
and do not store copies of any files).
33
See Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-2590, No. C 11-2766 MEJ, 2011 WL
4407172, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011) (indicating that the size of any swarm varies over time and can last more than twelve months depending on the popularity of
the motion picture distributed).
34
See First Time Videos, 2011WL3498227, at *1 (using trackers to locate
other peers that are distributing particular files).
35
See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (explaining that BitTorrent lets users
exchange data between themselves by exchanging file pieces with one another until
the entire file is transferred).
36
See Patrick Collins, 2011WL4407172, at *5 (increasing speed at which
peers download shared files as total number of peers in swarm increases).
37
See id. (explaining that as each peer receives file pieces, that peer simultaneously distributes those pieces to other peers).
38
See Hard Drive, 2011 WL 3740473, at *1 (examining how BitTorrent
users simultaneously receive and transfer information to other peers).
39
See id. at *2 (reasoning that BitTorrent's decentralized architecture makes
it less vulnerable to copyright infringement claims); see also Diabolic Video Prods.,
Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011WL3100404, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 31, 2011) ("Because there are no central servers to enjoin from unlawfully distributing copyrighted content, there is no primary target on which to focus anti-piracy
efforts.").
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distributing copyrighted content, as in Napster, are inapplicable to decentralized P2P networks since no central server is used to store copy40
righted material: file transfers occur directly between users. The Ninth
Circuit reached this conclusion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster Ltd., where it held that Grokster was not liable for vicarious or
contributory infringement since it did not store copyright infringing material on its servers. 41 The Supreme Court reversed the Grokster decision, but on the basis that Grokster induced users to engage in copyright
infringement. 42 Therefore, the parent corporations of decentralized P2P
networks can avoid liability if they do not facilitate copyright infringement by inducing or encouraging users to engage in such activity. 43 As a
result, copyright holders are unlikely to recover from the parent corporations of these passive P2P networks, and must instead bring suit against
44
P2P file-sharers individually.
Notwithstanding the anonymity provided by decentralized P2P filesharing networks, copyright holders can still manage to identify and find
defendants who engage in file sharing of copyrighted material because
users transmit their Internet Protocol (IP) address before they can distribute or receive files using BitTorrent. 45 Each user's IP address is associated with their Internet Service Provider (ISP), which assigns each of
its subscribers a unique IP address. 46 ISPs maintain records of the identifying information of their subscribers along with each subscriber's as40
See Hard Drive, 2011WL3740473, at *2 (indicating that BitTorrent's
central servers do not facilitate file transfers between peers); see also Vickie L. Feeman, William S. Coats, Heather D. Rafter & John G. Given, Revenge of the Record
Industry Association ofAmerica: The Rise and Fall ofNapster, 9 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 35, 55 (2002) (suggesting that the generation of file sharing networks after
Napster are harder to police and do not maintain lists of available content on a central
server).
41
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154,
1157 (9th Cir. 2004) (ruling that Grokster could not be held liable for vicarious and
contributory infringement merely because it distributed software that was used for
infringing activity).
42
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
916 (2005) (concluding that Grokster was almost exclusively used for copyright infringement and that Grokster encouraged users to engage in infringing activity by
holding itself out as Napster's replacement).
43
See id. (holding Grokster liable for inducing infringement rather than for
storing copyright infringing material on its central servers as in Napster).
44
See Galluzzo, supra note 30, at 1176 (discussing difficulty in enforcing
copyrights when users share files on decentralized networks with no central server).
45
See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011 WL
3498227, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (identifying BitTorrent users by their IP addresses, which are defined by the court as "identification numbers assigned to every
device connected to the internet").
46
See id. (noting that IP addresses are unique).
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central server to store and transmit data to or from users. Instead, BitTorrent uses its servers as "trackers," to store lists describing "swarms,"
which are groups of individual users involved in downloading and distributing particular files. 32 Swarms can last for several days or even sev33
eral weeks depending on the popularity of the file being shared.
For a BitTorrent user to engage in file sharing, a peer connects to a
34
tracker to find a swarm to download a particular file. Once a user locates a swarm, the user downloads small pieces of the file from several
other users, rather than downloading the file in its entirety from a single
user or a central server. 35 In this way, BitTorrent makes efficient use of
bandwidth and allows users to download files at higher speeds as the
number of peers in the swarm increases. 36 Lastly, once a user downloads
a particular file, the user automatically becomes a source for future users
to download the same file. 37 As a result, BitTorrent file sharing protocol
makes it impossible for any user to receive files without also sharing
files. 38
BitTorrent's decentralized nature insulates it from traditional antipiracy measures. 39 Actions to enjoin the central server from unlawfully
31
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See Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG,
2011WL3100404, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (allowing individual users to
exchange data with one another anonymously).
32
See First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011 WL
3498227, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (describing the use of a tracker to help peers
locate one another and noting that trackers do not participate directly in data transfer
and do not store copies of any files).
33
See Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-2590, No. C 11-2766 MEJ, 2011 WL
4407172, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011) (indicating that the size of any swarm varies over time and can last more than twelve months depending on the popularity of
the motion picture distributed).
34
See First Time Videos, 2011WL3498227, at *1 (using trackers to locate
other peers that are distributing particular files).
35
See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (explaining that BitTorrent lets users
exchange data between themselves by exchanging file pieces with one another until
the entire file is transferred).
36
See Patrick Collins, 2011WL4407172, at *5 (increasing speed at which
peers download shared files as total number of peers in swarm increases).
37
See id. (explaining that as each peer receives file pieces, that peer simultaneously distributes those pieces to other peers).
38
See Hard Drive, 2011 WL 3 740473, at *1 (examining how BitTorrent
users simultaneously receive and transfer information to other peers).
39
See id. at *2 (reasoning that BitTorrent's decentralized architecture makes
it less vulnerable to copyright infringement claims); see also Diabolic Video Prods.,
Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011WL3100404, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 31, 2011) ("Because there are no central servers to enjoin from unlawfully distributing copyrighted content, there is no primary target on which to focus anti-piracy
efforts.").
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1157 (9th Cir. 2004) (ruling that Grokster could not be held liable for vicarious and
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See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
916 (2005) (concluding that Grokster was almost exclusively used for copyright infringement and that Grokster encouraged users to engage in infringing activity by
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storing copyright infringing material on its central servers as in Napster).
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47

signed IP address. To obtainBitTorrentusers' IP addresses, some copyright holders contract with anti-piracy firms, such as Guardaley Limited, which use proprietary technology to track and log the IP addresses
ofBitTorrent users who distribute copyright holders' movies. 48
Despite the common use of IP addresses to identify infringers, this
method is problematic given that IP addresses often do not correspond
49
with a particular person. For example, some landlords provide internet
access for multiple tenants, children may use a relative' s internet connection while visiting, and others may simply gain access to a neighbor's
50
unsecure wireless network. The uncertainty in using IP addresses to
identify a particular person causes difficulty in determining who should
properly be named as a defendant. 51
II. UNMASKING ANONYMOUS FILE-SHARERS
The success of mass file sharing lawsuits depends in part upon copyright holders' ability to obtain the identifying information of putative
defendants who, at the time of filing suit, are known only by IP ad52
dress. To compel ISPs to provide identifying information, copyright
holders first turned to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
which includes a subpoena provision specifically allowing copyright
holders to subpoena ISPs to divulge the identifying information of users
linked to suspect IP addresses. 53 However, courts have interpreted the
DMCA subpoena provision narrowly, denying subpoenas issued to ISP's
acting as "conduits" in file sharing between users. 54 Without this rela-
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tively convenient remedy, copyright holders can unmask "John Does"
only by filing suit against unnamed defendants and subsequently issuing
civil subpoenas to ISPs. 55 Revealing the identity of anonymous users is
not without issue; in fact, several courts have held that John Does' filesharing activity should be afforded some degree of First Amendment
.
56
protect10n.

A. Paper Tiger: The DMCA § 512(h) Subpoena
In an attempt to modernize copyright law to account for changes in
an increasingly digital world, Congress enacted the DMCA with the intention that it serve two primary, yet somewhat conflicting purposes. 57
First, the DMCA is designed to protect the rights of copyright holders,
and second, it serves to limit ISPs' liability for the infringing activity of
their subscribers by granting ISPs "safe harbors in certain delineated
circumstances." 58 In contrast to the safe harbor provisions, which serve
to benefit ISPs, copyright holders benefit from the DMCA' s requirement
that ISPs remove infringing content, commonly referred to as "notice
and take down" provisions, and by 17 U.S.C § 512(h), which allows
copyright holders to subpoena ISPs to produce identifying information
for subscribers suspected of engaging in infringing activity. 59 The
§512(h) subpoena provided copyright holders with a convenient means
of obtaining the identifying information of anonymous users engaged in
illegal distribution of copyrighted materials. 60 Section 512(h) outlines the
minimal requirements necessary for a copyright holder to issue subpoe-

47

See id. (explaining that ISPs keep records of IP addresses assigned to each
of its subscribers).
48
See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332,
339 (D.D.C. 2011) (detailing how copyright holders hire anti-piracy firms to monitor
BitTorrent swarms in order to identify infringing users by their IP address, date, and
time of distributing copyright material).
49
See Nate Anderson, Hurt by the Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses Aren't
Enough to Find File-Swappers, ARs TECHNICA (Aug. 26, 2011),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-findfile-swappers.ars (suggesting that IP addresses are not accurate pieces of identifying
information).
50
See id. (providing examples of situations where IP addresses do not serve
to identify any particular person).
51
See id. (highlighting uncertainty in naming defendants to lawsuits using
only IP addresses).
52
See, e.g., Call ofthe Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 340 (moving for expedited discovery to subpoena ISPs to obtain the defendants' identifying information
in order to name them in the suit).
53
See infra notes 59-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying
text.
54
See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.

55

See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
57
See Alice Kao, Note, R.IAA v. Verizon: Applying the Subpoena Provision
of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 409 (2004) (describing the two purposes
that Congress intended the DMCA to serve).
58
Id. (noting Congress's first purpose for enacting the DMCA); 17 U.S.C. §
512(a)-(d) (2006) (shielding ISPs from liability for copyright infringement when the
ISPs engage in activities such as transmitting, system caching, storing information at
direction of user, or providing links to copyrighted, or otherwise protected materials).
59
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006) (granting a copyright holder, or a person
authorized to act on his behalf, the ability to issue a subpoena to an ISP in order to
obtain identifying information for infringing subscribers even where no lawsuit is
pending).
60
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A)-(C) (allowing copyright holder to issue
request for subpoena to any clerk of United States where request must include: copy
of notification, proposed subpoena, and sworn declaration that information sought is
for purpose of protecting copyright). See Kao, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 410 (outlining section 512(h)'s minimal requirements for obtaining subpoenas and indicating compulsory disclosure of identifying information by ISPs).
56
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access for multiple tenants, children may use a relative' s internet connection while visiting, and others may simply gain access to a neighbor's
unsecure wireless network. 50 The uncertainty in using IP addresses to
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holders first turned to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
which includes a subpoena provision specifically allowing copyright
holders to subpoena ISPs to divulge the identifying information of users
linked to suspect IP addresses. 53 However, courts have interpreted the
DMCA subpoena provision narrowly, denying subpoenas issued to ISP's
acting as "conduits" in file sharing between users. 54 Without this rela-
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tively convenient remedy, copyright holders can unmask "John Does"
only by filing suit against unnamed defendants and subsequently issuing
civil subpoenas to ISPs. 55 Revealing the identity of anonymous users is
not without issue; in fact, several courts have held that John Does' filesharing activity should be afforded some degree of First Amendment
.
56
protect10n.

A. Paper Tiger: The DMCA § 512(h) Subpoena
In an attempt to modernize copyright law to account for changes in
an increasingly digital world, Congress enacted the DMCA with the intention that it serve two primary, yet somewhat conflicting purposes. 57
First, the DMCA is designed to protect the rights of copyright holders,
and second, it serves to limit ISPs' liability for the infringing activity of
their subscribers by granting ISPs "safe harbors in certain delineated
circumstances." 58 In contrast to the safe harbor provisions, which serve
to benefit ISPs, copyright holders benefit from the DMCA' s requirement
that ISPs remove infringing content, commonly referred to as "notice
and take down" provisions, and by 17 U.S.C § 512(h), which allows
copyright holders to subpoena ISPs to produce identifying information
for subscribers suspected of engaging in infringing activity. 59 The
§512(h) subpoena provided copyright holders with a convenient means
of obtaining the identifying information of anonymous users engaged in
illegal distribution of copyrighted materials. 60 Section 512(h) outlines the
minimal requirements necessary for a copyright holder to issue subpoe-

47

See id. (explaining that ISPs keep records of IP addresses assigned to each
of its subscribers).
48
See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332,
339 (D.D.C. 2011) (detailing how copyright holders hire anti-piracy firms to monitor
BitTorrent swarms in order to identify infringing users by their IP address, date, and
time of distributing copyright material).
49
See Nate Anderson, Hurt by the Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses Aren't
Enough to Find File-Swappers, ARs TECHNICA (Aug. 26, 2011),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011 /08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-findfile-swappers.ars (suggesting that IP addresses are not accurate pieces of identifying
information).
50
See id. (providing examples of situations where IP addresses do not serve
to identify any particular person).
51
See id. (highlighting uncertainty in naming defendants to lawsuits using
only IP addresses).
52
See, e.g., Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 340 (moving for expedited discovery to subpoena ISPs to obtain the defendants' identifying information
in order to name them in the suit).
53
See infra notes 59-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying
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54
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55

See infra notes 69-7 5 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
57
See Alice Kao, Note, RIAA v. Verizon: Applying the Subpoena Provision
of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 409 (2004) (describing the two purposes
that Congress intended the DMCA to serve).
58
Id. (noting Congress's first purpose for enacting the DMCA); 17 U.S.C. §
512(a)-(d) (2006) (shielding ISPs from liability for copyright infringement when the
ISPs engage in activities such as transmitting, system caching, storing information at
direction of user, or providing links to copyrighted, or otherwise protected materials).
59
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006) (granting a copyright holder, or a person
authorized to act on his behalf, the ability to issue a subpoena to an ISP in order to
obtain identifying information for infringing subscribers even where no lawsuit is
pending).
60
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A)-(C) (allowing copyright holder to issue
request for subpoena to any clerk of United States where request must include: copy
of notification, proposed subpoena, and sworn declaration that information sought is
for purpose of protecting copyright). See Kao, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 410 (outlining section 512(h)'s minimal requirements for obtaining subpoenas and indicating compulsory disclosure of identifying information by ISPs).
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nas and obtain identifying information of a suspected infringing party
from an ISP. 61
Despite Congress's good intentions in developing the DMCA subpoena provisions, Congress drafted the DMCA prior to the rise of P2P
networks. 62 As a result, courts have refused to grant subpoenas pursuant
to § 512(h) where the infringing activity took place on BitTorrent or
other P2P networks. 63
In Recording Industry Association ofAmerica, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., the D.C. Circuit became the first court to consider the
issue and it determined that § 512(h) did not apply when an ISP acts
simply as a conduit for transmission of information sent by others. 64 The
court stated that "[i]t is not the province of the courts ... to rewrite the
DMCA in order to make it fit a new and unforeseen internet architecture,
no matter how damaging that development has been." 65 The court predicated this finding on its assumption that:
Had the Congress been aware of P2P technology, or anticipated
its development, § 512(h) might have been drafted more generally. Be that as it may ... nothing in the legislative history
supports the issuance of a § 512(h) subpoena to an ISP acting
as a conduit for P2P file-sharing. 66

61
See Kristina Groennings, Note, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry's Litigation Ag~inst Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 574 (noting that
previously, to obtain a§ 512(h) subpoena, the RIAA only needed to supply a small
fee and, "a copy of notification, the proposed subpoena, and a sworn declaration
indicating that the information sought was for the sole purpose of protecting copyright."); see also Colin E. Shanahan, Comment, ACTA Fool or: How Rights Holders
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 512 's Subpoena Provisions, 15 MARQ. lNTELL.
PROP. L. REv. 465, 470 (2011) (listing the steps a rights holder is required to follow in
order to obtain a§ 512(h) subpoena).
62
See Kao, supra note 57, at 409 (noting that "the DMCA was enacted in
1998, before the explosive rise in P2P popularity'').
63
See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351
F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that a subpoena may only be served on
an ISP that is storing infringing materials on its servers, and that a subpoena may not
be served on an ISP that merely serves as the means through which files are shared on
P2P networks); see also Interscope Records v. Does 1-7, 494 F. Supp. 2d 388, 391
· (E.D. Va. 2007) (refusing to authorize§ 512(h) subpoenas that were served on colleges for the purpose of discovering the identity of students who were engaged in infringing activity).
64
See Recording Indus. Ass'n ofAm., 351 F.3d at 1238 (explaining that
"Congress had no reason to foresee the application of§ 512(h) to P2P file sharing.").
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Similarly, the Eighth Circuit and several lower courts have held that
when the ISP acts as a "conduit" between two users, as in the case of
P2P networks, a§ 512(h) subpoena cannot be issued to an ISP. 67

B. Fighting the Army of Pirates: John Doe Lawsuits
Although the DMCA intended to provide copyright holders with a
subpoena to obtain identifying information for infringing parties, courts
have held that its provisions do not extend to P2P networks. 68 Copyright
holders, however, have an alternative means of obtaining an infringer's
identifying information: instead of issuing a subpoena under the DMCA,
the copyright holders can file "John Doe" lawsuits. 69
Under the "John Doe" litigation strategy, copyright holders may file
lawsuits against unnamed putative defendants identified only by their IP
70
addresses. The copyright holders could then move for expedited discovery and issue civil subpoenas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro71
cedure 45 to ISPs requesting the identifying information of each defendant based on their IP addresses. 72 John Doe lawsuits tend to be costly for copyright holders, but they are the only means available to identify
and recover from infringers using modem P2P networks. 73 Further, John
Doe lawsuits raise novel procedural questions, including: whether ISP
defendants can raise objections to personal jurisdiction prior to naming
"John Doe" defendants in suit, whether courts should grant copyright
67

See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005)
(agreeing with defendant ISP's argument that a§ 512(h) subpoena served on the ISP
was improper because the ISP functioned as a conduit to transfer data between two
users on a P2P network); see also In re Subpoena to Univ. ofN.C. at Chapel Hill, 367
F. Supp. 2d 945, 956 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (rejecting the RIAA's request to extend§
512(h) subpoena provisions to ISPs serving as conduits for data transfers between two
internet users).
68
See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.·
69
See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d)(l) (allowing parties to seek discovery prior to
holding a Rule 26(f) conference, pursuant to a court order).
70
See Shanahan, supra note 61, at 473 (describing the process by which
copyright holders may file John Doe lawsuits against unnamed defendants who are
suspected of engaging in copyright infringement through the use of P2P file sharing
networks).
71
See FED. R. Crv. P. 45(A) (setting forth the requirements for obtaining a
civil subpoena).
72
See Shanahan, supra note 61, at 473 (explaining how rights-holders use
civil subpoenas to "compel the ISP associated with each IP address to divulge the
names and addresses associated with those IP addresses.").
73
Id. (indicating that John Doe lawsuits are a copyright holder's only recourse for identifying and holding accountable copyright infringers); see also Dickman, supra note 23, at 1053 (noting that the typical music downloading copyright
infringement suit is a John Doe lawsuit brought by a recording company).
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users on a P2P network); see also In re Subpoena to Univ. ofN.C. at Chapel Hill, 367
F. Supp. 2d 945, 956 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (rejecting the RIAA's request to extend§
512(h) subpoena provisions to ISPs serving as conduits for data transfers between two
internet users).
68
See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.·
69
See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d)(l) (allowing parties to seek discovery prior to
holding a Rule 26(f) conference, pursuant to a court order).
70
See Shanahan, supra note 61, at 473 (describing the process by which
copyright holders may file John Doe lawsuits against unnamed defendants who are
suspected of engaging in copyright infringement through the use of P2P file sharing
networks).
71
See FED. R. Crv. P. 45(A) (setting forth the requirements for obtaining a
civil subpoena).
72
See Shanahan, supra note 61, at 473 (explaining how rights-holders use
civil subpoenas to "compel the ISP associated with each IP address to divulge the
names and addresses associated with those IP addresses.").
73
Id. (indicating that John Doe lawsuits are a copyright holder's only recourse for identifying and holding accountable copyright infringers); see also Dickman, supra note 23, at 1053 (noting that the typical music downloading copyright
infringement suit is a John Doe lawsuit brought by a recording company).
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holders expedited discovery to identify John Does; and, whether j oinder
of all defendants is proper. 74
Another concern raised in John Doe lawsuits stems from judicial
recognition that the First Amendment's protections are implicated by
civil subpoenas that seek disclosure of anonymous users' identifying
information. 75 Some courts have concluded that file sharing via P2P
networks qualifies as free speech under the First Amendment and should
be afforded some degree ofprotection. 76 Nevertheless, courts have generally agreed that "First Amendment privacy interests are exceedingly
small where the 'speech' is the alleged infringement of copyrights." 77
Accordingly, the court in Sony Music Entertainment Inc., v. Does 1-40,
held that because file-sharers are not seeking to communicate a thought
or idea, and are simply attempting to obtain free music, such speech
78
should be afforded only limited First Amendment protection.
When considering whether the First Amendment's protections extend to a file-sharer's right to engage in anonymous speech, the court in
Sonyconsidered five factors that various courts have used to determine
whether a defendant's identity should be protected from disclosure. 79
The five factors the court considered in Sony were: 1) a concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm; 2) the specificity of the
discovery request; 3) an absence of alternative means to obtain subpoenaed information; 4) a central need for the subpoenaed information to

74
See infra notes 87-112 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
procedural issues involved in mass file sharing lawsuits.
75
See Call of the Wild Movie LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 349
(D.D.C. 2011) (recognizing that file-sharing involves expressive communication); see
also First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011WL3498227, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (indicating that file-sharers First Amendment protections are
limited); see also Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289(RWS), 2004
WL 2095581, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 8, 2004); see also Sony Music Entm'tv. Does 1-40,
326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (holding that while downloading, distributing,
and making available copyrighted sound recordings is entitled to First Amendment protection, such protection is very limited.)
76
See Sony, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (arguing that "a file sharer is making a
statement by downloading and making available to others copyrighted music without
charge and without license to do so ... [and] may be expressing himself or herself
through the music selected and made available to others.").
77
See Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008)
(listing cases that hold that First Amendment protections are small when the speech
involves copyright infringement).
78
See Sony, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (finding that file-sharers are entitled to
"some level of First Amendment protection.").
79
See id. (concluding that use of P2P networks to download and distribute
music entitles a user to a limited degree of First Amendment protection that must be
weighed against plaintiff's need for disclosure of identifying information).
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advance the claim; and, 5) the party's expectation ofprivacy. 80 Ultimately, the court in Sony found that each factor supported the disclosure of
the defendants' identifying information and that the defendants' First
Amendment right to remain anonymous gave way to the plaintiffs' right
to pursue its copyright infringement claims. 81 The factors used in Sony
establish a low threshold for obtainillg a civil subpoena and courts applying the Sony test typically grant plaintiffs' requests for subpoenas. 82
Moreover, several courts have applied Sony's five-factor test in considering whether to allow subpoenas in the context of P2P file sharing. 83
Courts that reject the conclusion that file sharing is entitled to some
level of First Amendment protection have applied, in the alternative to
the Sony test, a "good cause" test. 84 The good cause test provides no special protections for anonymous speech. 85 The good cause test is satisfied
when there are allegations of copyright infringement and expedited discovery would contribute to the case moving forward. 86 In general, when
the speech in question involves copyright infringement, courts tend to
apply a low burden test such as the Sony test or the good cause test. 87
Under either of these tests, subpoenas that reveal the identifying information of anonymous P2P file-sharers are typically granted. 88
80

See id. at 564-65 (describing the factors used for determining whether to
grant a subpoena to a copyright holder).
81
See id. at 567 (holding that "defendants' First Amendment right to remain
anonymous must give way to plaintiffs' right to ... pursue what appear to be meritorious copyright infringement claims.").
82
See Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Shielding Jane and John:
Can the Media Protect Anonymous Online Speech? 26-COMMC 'NS LAWYER 4, 6-7
(2009) (discussing the plaintiff's low burden on plaintiff for satisfying the Sony requirements for obtaining a subpoena).
83
See Interscope Records v. Does 1-14, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179-80 (D.
Kan. 2008) (using Sony's five factor analysis, and finding the factors weighed in
favor of compelling disclosure of the identifying information); see also Elektra
Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289(RWS), 2004 WL 2095581, at *4-5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004) (applying Sony's five-factor analysis and finding each factor
favored disclosure).
84
See Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 87, at 7 (explaining that the "good
cause" test "provides no special protection for anonymous speech").
85
See id. ("The good cause test is the weakest standard created by the
courts.").
86
See id. (summarizing the minimal showing required to establish good
cause).
87
See id. at 5 (indicating that the type of speech is a primary issue in determining the degree of burden to apply to plaintiff's subpoena request).
88
See Interscope, 558 F. Supp. at 1179-81 (applying the Sony test and denying the motion to quash the subpoena); see also Elektra, 2004 WL 2095581, at *4-5
(applying the Sony test and denying the motion to quash the subpoena); see also Sony
Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying
defendant's motion to quash the subpoena); see also LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-
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See Sony, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (finding that file-sharers are entitled to
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See id. (concluding that use of P2P networks to download and distribute
music entitles a user to a limited degree of First Amendment protection that must be
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advance the claim; and, 5) the party's expectation ofprivacy. 80 Ultimately, the court in Sony found that each factor supported the disclosure of
the defendants' identifying information and that the defendants' First
Amendment right to remain anonymous gave way to the plaintiffs' right
to pursue its copyright infringement claims. 81 The factors used in Sony
establish a low threshold for obtaining a civil subpoena and courts applying the Sony test typically grant plaintiffs' requests for subpoenas. 82
Moreover, several courts have applied Sony's five-factor test in considering whether to allow subpoenas in the context of P2P file sharing. 83
Courts that reject the conclusion that file sharing is entitled to some
level of First Amendment protection have applied, in the alternative to
the Sony test, a "good cause" test. 84 The good cause test provides no special protections for anonymous speech. 85 The good cause test is satisfied
when there are allegations of copyright infringement and expedited discovery would contribute to the case moving forward. 86 In general, when
the speech in question involves copyright infringement, courts tend to
apply a low burden test such as the Sony test or the good cause test. 87
Under either of these tests, subpoenas that reveal the identifying information of anonymous P2P file-sharers are typically granted. 88
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See id. at 564-65 (describing the factors used for determining whether to
grant a subpoena to a copyright holder).
81
See id. at 567 (holding that "defendants' First Amendment right to remain
anonymous must give way to plaintiffs' right to ... pursue what appear to be meritorious copyright infringement claims.").
82
See Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Shielding Jane and John:
Can the Media Protect Anonymous Online Speech? 26-COMMC 'NS LAWYER 4, 6-7
(2009) (discussing the plaintiff's low burden on plaintiff for satisfying the Sony requirements for obtaining a subpoena).
83
See Interscope Records v. Does 1-14, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179-80 (D.
Kan. 2008) (using Sony's five factor analysis, and finding the factors weighed in
favor of compelling disclosure of the identifying information); see also Elektra
Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289(RWS), 2004 WL 2095581, at *4-5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004) (applying Sony's five-factor analysis and finding each factor
favored disclosure).
84
See Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 87, at 7 (explaining that the "good
cause" test "provides no special protection for anonymous speech").
85
See id. ("The good cause test is the weakest standard created by the
courts.").
86
See id. (summarizing the minimal showing required to establish good
cause).
87
See id. at 5 (indicating that the type of speech is a primary issue in determining the degree of burden to apply to plaintiff's subpoena request).
88
See Interscope, 558 F. Supp. at 1179-81 (applying the Sony test and denying the motion to quash the subpoena); see also Elektra, 2004 WL 2095581, at *4-5
(applying the Sony test and denying the motion to quash the subpoena); see also Sony
Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying
defendant's motion to quash the subpoena); see also LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-
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III. MIXED SYMPATIDES FOR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
Although John Doe suits may be copyright holders' last line of defense against direct infringers, these mass lawsuits have encountered
judges that seem unsympathetic to the copyright holders' plight. 89 Judges
presiding over mass file sharing cases have reached largely dissimilar
conclusions on threshold procedural issues. 9 For example, two of the
largest mass suits against P2P file-sharers were both brought in the district court for the District of Columbia and resulted in entirely disparate
91
outcomes. In Voltage Pictures, Judge Howell allowed the plaintiff to
take leave for expedited discovery and denied all of the defendants' motions to protect their identifying information. 92 On the other hand, Judge
Wilkins in Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 23,322 rejected the plaintiff's motion
for expedited discovery, and shortly thereafter the plaintiff dropped the
entire suit against all defendants. 93
Other courts have employed various approaches to limit and control
the mass file sharing cases and have taken issue with different aspects of
94
the suits. InAchte/Nuente Boll Kina Beteilingungs GMBh & Co. KG v.
Does 1-4,577, Judge Collyer rejected the copyright holders' request fora
five-year extension to identify and serve each of the defendants it wished

°

5, No. 2:07-CV-187, 2007 WL 2867351, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2007) (applying
the good cause test and granting the plaintiffs request for a subpoena).
89
See Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42 (D.D.C.
2011) (rejecting plaintiffs motion for expedited discovery); see also Hard Drive
Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011WL3740473, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 23, 2011) (quashing subpoenas that sought identifying information for all but
one defendant).
90
See irifra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
91
See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying plaintiffs
request for ex parte discovery, stating that discovery is inappropriate where the plaintiff has not shown good cause that court will have jurisdiction over the putative defendants). But see Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011
WL 1807438, at *10 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (granting the plaintiff's request for ex
parte discovery and denying the defendants' motions to quash subpoenas aimed at
obtaining the defendants' identifying information).
92
See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *1 (allowing plaintiff to take
leave for expedited discovery in order to obtain identifying information for John Doe
defendants).
93
See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff's
request for expedited discovery).
94
See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
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to sue. 95 The court originally gave the plaintiffs until November 18,
2010, and, after rejecting the request for a five-year extension, allowed
the copyright holders until December 6, 2010. 96 After this instruction,
the lawyers pared the original list of 6,230 defendants down to 868 who
were known to or were likely to live in the district in which the case was
filed; the remaining cases were dismissed. 97
Some courts find issue with the uncertainty in using IP addresses as
a means of identifying defendants. 98 A district court judge in West Virginia dismissed every defendant but one in each of the mass file-sharing
lawsuits before his court. 99 The judge also demanded that each case be
filed separately and that plaintiffs only submit IP addresses likely to cor100
respond to internet users in West Virginia. Other commentators note
that an IP address is only a starting point for investigation and is not evidence of guilt and by filing suit against defendants based only on their IP
addresses, the copyright holders filing mass P2P file-sharing cases across
the country are not relying on thorough investigation. 101 Expressing disfavor for file sharing lawsuits, Judge Baker of Illinois stated that, "the
court is concerned that the expedited ex parte discovery is a fishing expedition by means of a perversion of the purpose and intent of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 102
95

See Achte/Nuente Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH & Co. KG v. Does 14,577, No. 10-453 (RMC), 2010 WL 4905811, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2010) (denying
plaintiffs request for extension of time to identify defendants in that doing so would
be prejudicial to already named defendants).
96
See id. (holding that plaintiff must serve the court by December 6, 2010
with the complaint identifying defendants by name and address over whom the plaintiff reasonably believes the court will have personal jurisdiction).
97
See Nate Anderson, US Copyright Group Drops 5000 P2P Defendants
from Case, AR.s TECHNICA (Dec. 7, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2010/12/us-copyright-group-drops-5 ,OOO-p2p-defendants-from-cases.ars
(limiting amount of time plaintiff could take to determine identities of anonymous
users).
98
See irifra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
99
See Nate Anderson, Judge Kills Massive P2P Porn Lawsuit, Kneecaps
Copyright Trolls, AR.s TECHNICA (Dec. 17, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2010/12/judge-kills-massive-p2p-pom-lawsuit-kneecaps-copyrighttroll.ars (dismissing defendants in file sharing case).
100
See id. (severing defendants and requiring plaintiff to identify defendants
likely to reside in West Virginia).
101
See Nate Anderson, Hurt by the Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses aren't
Enough to Find File-Swappers, AR.s TECHNICA (Aug. 26, 2011),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-findfile-swappers.ars (suggesting that, in most cases, IP addresses do not identify particular individuals).
102
See Nate Anderson, Judge: P2P Class Action Suit Looks Like a Fishing
Expedition, AR.s TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2011 /03/judge-p2p-class-action-suit-looks-like-a-fishing-expedition.ars
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Expedition, A.Rs TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2011/03/judge-p2p-class-action-suit-looks-like-a-fishing-expedition.ars

346

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

MASS FILE SHARING LAWSUITS

[Vol. 3:2]

Although the file-sharing cases raise a variety of procedural issues,
the copyright law issues in these cases are straightforward. 103 Generally,
c_ourt~ ho_ld that the plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of copy~ght infringement in that "1) [plaintiffs have] ownership of a valid copynght, and 2) [there was] copying [by the defendant] of constituent elements of the work that are original." 104 Thus, the prima facie case is gen~rally satisfied by the copyright holder's complaint, 105 which would typically allege that the plaintiffs own the copyrighted movie at issue, and
that the defendants used a P2P network to download and distribute copy" hted music.
· 106 Moreover, the use of P2P file sharing to download and
ng
distribute copyrighted files has been held to constitute copyright infrin gement. 107 Courts have consequently held that such a complaint sufficiently states a claim and supporting factual basis for copyright infringement. 108
Few defendants contest the copyright infringement aspect of the case
and instead, John Doe defendants raise an assortment of procedural defenses. 109 For instance, in Voltage Pictures, 119 of the putative defendants filed a variety of motions to protect their identifying information or
. . d fr om the case. 110 Seventy-one defendants filed motions
to b e disrmsse
to quash subpoenas issued to ISPs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45, which requires a court to quash a subpoena when it "requires disclo-

(expressing concern that allowing discovery without hearing from the adversarial
party would be unfair).
103
See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
104
.
Feist Publ'ns~ Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (settmg forth elements of pnma facie case of copyright infringement)
105 s
.
ee, e.g., LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008
~ 544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) (concluding that the plaintiffs "sufficiently stated a claim and supporting factual basis for copyright infringement").
106
This showing typically includes an exhibit detailing the P2P network used,
an IP address for each defendant, and the date and time the particular file was down~oa~ed. See id. (finding complaint sufficient to provide prima facie case of copyright
mfringement).
107
See Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565-66
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14
(~th Cir. 200~)) (holding that the use ofNapster to download and distribute copynghted matenals constitutes copyright infringement).
108 s
ee LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *2 (establishing prima facie
claim of copyright infringement based on plaintiff's complaint).
109
See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, 2011WL1807438, at *1
(D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (indicating that 119 defendants raised motions to quash subpoenas sent to ISPs for identifying information on various grounds including lack of
personal jurisdiction and improper joinder).
110
See id. (describing defendants' various motions to protect their identifying
information).
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sure of privileged or other protected matter."lll Thirty-five ~~fend~i:ts
filed motions for protective orders to protect disclosure of therr identities
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), which provides that a court
may "issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar112
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Seven defendants
113
filed motions to dismiss based on improper joinder. Finally, forty-two
putative defendants filed motions to dismiss based o_n lack of _Personal
jurisdiction. 114 While the court in Voltage Pict~res ultlfilately re~ ected_ all
of the defendants' motions, other courts have given greater consideration
to defendants' motions. 115 Of the motions raised by defendants in filesharing lawsuits, the two most frequently raised, and which generate the
most disagreement among district courts, are the motions for dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction and for dismissal based on improper
.. d 116
JOlll er.

A. Personal Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Discovery
Prior to being named in the suit, most John Doe defendants seek
dismissal from the file sharing suits based on lack of personal jurisdiction. 117 Once a defendant raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction the burden of establishing a prima facie case of pertinent jurisdiction~! facts shifts to the plaintiff. 118 To meet this burden, a plaintiff will
normally be afforded the opportunity to engage in the discovery neces-

111 Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (setting
forth requirements for obtaining a civil subpoena).
112 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *4 (holding that because
defendants are not subject to subpoenas issued by plaintiff, defendants suffer noundue burden from plaintiff's discovery request).
113 See id. (arguing that defendants are improperly joined).
114 See id. at *8 (asserting that court does not have personal jurisdiction over

,
See id. at *IO (stating that defendants failed to demonstrate that subpoenas
should be quashed, protected orders are warranted, or that defendants should otherwise be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction or improper j oinder).
116 For a further discussion of how courts have ruled regarding personal jurisdiction and joinder in John Doe file-sharing lawsuits, see infra notes 117-167 and
accompanying text.
.
. .
117 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *8 (contestmg personalJunsdiction and supplying affidavits to show that defendants do not reside or transact
business in district in which suit has been brought); see also West Coast Prods., Inc.
v. Does 1-5829, No. 11-57 (CKK), 2011WL2292239, at *4 (D.D.C. June 10, 2011)
(arguing that because defendants have no contact with forum jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction is lacking).
118 See West Coast, 2011WL2292239, at *14 (citing First Chicago Int'! v.
United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

defendant).
115
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Although the file-sharing cases raise a variety of procedural issues
the copyright law issue~ ~these cases are straightforward. 103 Generally:
c.ourt~ ho.Id that the plamtiffs have made a prima facie showing of copy~ght infringement in that "I) [plaintiffs have] ownership of a valid copynght, and 2) [there was] copying [by the defendant] of constituent elements of ~he work that are original." 104 Thus, the prima facie case is gen~rally satisfied by the copyright holder's complaint, 105 which would typically allege that the plaintiffs own the copyrighted movie at issue, and
that the defendants used a P2P network to download and distribute copy. hte d music.
. 106 Moreover, the use of P2P file sharing to download and
ng
distribute copyrighted files has been held to constitute copyright infrin gement. 107 Courts have consequently held that such a complaint sufficiently states a claim and supporting factual basis for copyright infringement. 108
Few defendants contest the copyright infringement aspect of the case
and instead, John Doe defendants raise an assortment of procedural de.C'.
109p
.
.
ienses.
or mstance,
m
Vo l tage Pictures, 119 of the putative defendants filed a variety of motions to protect their identifying information or
. . dfrom the case. 110 Seventy-one defendants filed motions
to b e disilllsse
to quash subpoenas issued to ISPs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45, which requires a court to quash a subpoena when it "requires disclo-

(expressing concern that allowing discovery without hearing from the adversarial
party would be unfair).
103
See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
104
.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (setting fo~~ elements of prima facie case of copyright infringement).
See, e.g., LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008
~ 544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) (concluding that the plaintiffs "sufficiently stated a claim and supporting factual basis for copyright infringement").
106
This showing typically includes an exhibit detailing the P2P network used,
an IP address for each defendant, and the date and time the particular file was down~oa~ed. See id. (finding complaint sufficient to provide prima facie case of copyright
mfringement).
107
See Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565-66
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14
(~th Cir. 200~)) (holding that the use ofNapster to download and distribute copynghted matenals constitutes copyright infringement).
108 s
.
ee LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *2 (establishing prima facie
claim o&~opyright infringement based on plaintiff's complaint).
See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, 2011WL1807438, at *1
(D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (indicating that 119 defendants raised motions to quash subpoenas s~nt ~o !S~s for id~ntifying information on various grounds including lack of
personal Junsd1ction and rmproper joinder).
11 0
.
_ See id. (describing defendants' various motions to protect their identifying
mformation).
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sure of privileged or other protected matter." m Thirty-five ~~fend~i:its
filed motions for protective orders to protect dis~losure o~ therr identities
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), which provides that a court
roay "issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar112
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Seven defendants
113
filed motions to dismiss based on improper joinder. Finally, forty-two
putative defendants filed motions to dismiss based o_n lack of _Personal
·urisdiction. 114 While the court in Voltage Pictures ultrmately reJ ected all
Jof the defendants' motions, other courts have given greater consideration
to defendants' motions. 115 Of the motions raised by defendants in filesharing lawsuits, the two most frequently raised, and ':hich gen~rat~ the
most disagreement among district courts, are the mot10ns for disilllssal
for lack of personal jurisdiction and for dismissal based on improper
.. d 116
JOlll er.

A. Personal Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Discovery
Prior to being named in the suit, most John Doe defendants seek
dismissal from the file sharing suits based on lack of personal jurisdiction. 117 Once a defendant raises the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction the burden of establishing a prima facie case of pertinent jurisdiction~! facts shifts to the plaintiff. 118 To meet this burden, a plaintiff will
normally be afforded the opportunity to engage in the discovery neces-

111 Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (setting
forth requirements for obtaining a civil subpoena).
112 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *4 (holding that because
defendants are not subject to subpoenas issued by plaintiff, defendants suffer noundue burden from plaintiff's discovery request).
113 See id. (arguing that defendants are improperly joined). . . . .
114 See id. at *8 (asserting that court does not have personalJunsd1ction over
,
defendant).
115 See id. at *10 (stating that defendants failed to demonstrate that subpoenas
should be quashed, protected orders are warranted, or that defendants should otherwise be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction or improper joinder).
116 For a further discussion of how courts have ruled regarding personal jurisdiction and joinder in John Doe file-sharing lawsuits, see infra notes 117-167 and
accompanying text.
.
. .
117 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *8 (contesting personalJunsdiction and supplying affidavits to show that defendants do not reside or transact
business in district in which suit has been brought); see also West Coast Prods., Inc.
v. Does 1-5829, No. 11-57 (CKK), 2011WL2292239, at *4 (D.D.C. June 10, 2011)
(arguing that because defendants have no contact with forum jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction is lacking).
118 See West Coast, 2011WL2292239, at *14 (citing First Chicago Int'! v.
United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
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sary to determine jurisdictional facts. 119 Otherwise, where the plaintiffs
have little information about the defendants, generally limited to the defendants' IP addresses and method of engagement in the infringing activity, the court has no way to evaluate defendants' jurisdictional defenses. 120
In order to establish personal jurisdiction, a court must examine
whether personal jurisdiction is proper under the state's long arm statute,
and also whether jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of due process. 121
"Due process requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant has 'minimum contacts' with the forum, thereby ensuring that 'the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 122
In Call ofthe Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, the court employed
the prototypical analysis of personal jurisdiction and jurisdictional discovery in John Doe type file sharing suits. 123 The court began its analysis
by noting that the District of Columbia's standard for permitting jurisdictional discovery is quite liberal. 124 Specifically, in the District of Columbia, jurisdictional discovery is available when a party has "at least a good
faith belief' that it has personal jurisdiction. 125 Setting this low threshold
for allowing jurisdictional discovery, the court in Call ofthe Wild Movie
held that it was premature to address personal jurisdiction before the
plaintiff had the opportunity to discover relevant jurisdictional infor-

119
See id. (citing GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d
1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (allowing for discovery of pertinent jurisdictional facts
where the information available is plainly insufficient to assess defendants' jurisdictional defenses).
120
See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 346; see also London-Sire
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 180-81 (D. Mass. 2008) (permitting
plaintiff to engage in jurisdictional discovery and stating that it is premature to adjudicate personal jurisdiction); see also Sony Music Entm 't Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 567
(stating that evaluating personal jurisdiction is premature without defendants' identifying information).
121
See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (setting forth requirements of personal jurisdiction).
122
Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)).
123
See id. at 346 (assessing defendants' claim of lack ofpersonaljurisdiction).
124
See id. (observing that jurisdictional discovery has been permitted even
without establishment of prima facie case of personal jurisdiction).
125
See id. (citing Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148
F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
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mation about the John Doe defendants, and thus granted the plaintiffs
. di ct10na
.
1 di scovery request. 126
juns
Although courts generally allow plaintiffs to undertake jurisdictional
discovery, the court in Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,222 rejected the copyright holder's motion to take leave for expedited discovery and issue
subpoenas upon ISPs in order to determine the identifying information of
127
the defendants. In rejecting the plaintiffs motion for expedited discovery, the court stated that it "has broad discretion in its resolution of
discovery problems that arise in cases pending before it." 128 The court
limited Nu Image's suit to those defendants whom Nu Image had "good
cause" to believe resided within the District of Columbia. 129 In support
of this holding, the court further stated that it must consider the "delay
and unproductive utilization of court resources" in prosecuting a lawsuit
in which the vast majority of defendants would have to be dismissed
after discovery revealed that they did not reside in the District of Colum. 130
bIa.
[I]n deciding whether a request comes within the discovery
rules, a court is not required to blind itself to the purpose for
which a party seeks information. Thus, when the purpose of a
discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied.131
This decision prompted Nu Image to voluntarily abandon the suit
against the twenty thousand odd defendants, including the defendants
that did live in the District of Columbia. 132
The court's holding in Nu Image turned on an analysis of personal
jurisdiction, despite the fact that the Doe defendants had yet to be named

126
See id. at 345 (holding that Court is in no position to evaluate the defendants' specific connections with the District of Columbia, and that quashing subpoenas
would bar the plaintiffs from obtaining discovery relevant to that evaluation).
127
See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (rejecting plaintiffs motion to take
leave for ex parte discovery).
128
Id. (citing Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
129
See id. (limiting the defendants that could be named in the suit).
130
See id. at 41 (taking into consideration efficient utilization of judicial
resources).
131
Id. (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 43 7 U.S. 340, 352 n.17
(1978)).
.
132
See The Expendables Makers Dismiss Massive BitTorrent Lawsuit,
TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 25, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/the-expendables-makersdismiss-massive-bittorrent-lawsuit-110825/ (revealing that Nu Image dropped its suit
against all defendants upon court's refusal to grant jurisdictional discovery).
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sary to determine jurisdictional facts. 119 Otherwise, where the plaintiffs
have little information about the defendants, generally limited to the defendants' IP addresses and method of engagement in the infringing activity, the court has no way to evaluate defendants' jurisdictional defenses. 120
In order to establish personal jurisdiction, a court must examine
whether personal jurisdiction is proper under the state's long arm statute,
and also whether jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of due process. 121
"Due process requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant has 'minimum contacts' with the forum, thereby ensuring that 'the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 122
In Call ofthe Wild Movie, LLCv. Does 1-1062, the court employed
the prototypical analysis of personal jurisdiction and jurisdictional discovery in John Doe type file sharing suits. 123 The court began its analysis
by noting that the District of Columbia's standard for permitting jurisdictional discovery is quite liberal. 124 Specifically, in the District of Columbia, jurisdictional discovery is available when a party has "at least a good
faith belief' that it has personal jurisdiction. 125 Setting this low threshold
for allowing jurisdictional discovery, the court in Call ofthe Wild Movie
held that it was premature to address personal jurisdiction before the
plaintiff had the opportunity to discover relevant jurisdictional infor-

119
See id. (citing GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d
1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (allowing for discovery of pertinent jurisdictional facts
where the information available is plainly insufficient to assess defendants' jurisdictional defenses).
120
See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 346; see also London-Sire
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 180-81 (D. Mas~. 2008) (permitting
plaintiff to engage in jurisdictional discovery and stating that it is premature to adjudicate personal jurisdiction); see also Sony Music Entm 't Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 567
(stating that evaluating personal jurisdiction is premature without defendants' identifying information).
121
See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (setting forth requirements of personal jurisdiction).
122
Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)).
123
See id. at 346 (assessing defendants' claim oflack ofpersonaljurisdiction).
124
See id. (observing that jurisdictional discovery has been permitted even
without establishment ofprima facie case of personal jurisdiction).
125
See id. (citing Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148
F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
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mation about the John Doe defendants, and thus granted the plaintiffs
. d.1ct10na
. 1 di scovery request. 126
juns
Although courts generally allow plaintiffs to undertake jurisdictional
discovery, the court in Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,222 rejected the copyright holder's motion to take leave for expedited discovery and issue
subpoenas upon ISPs in order to determine the identifying information of
the defendants. 127 In rejecting the plaintiffs motion for expedited discovery, the court stated that it "has broad discretion in its resolution of
discovery problems that arise in cases pending before it." 128 The court
limited Nu Image's suit to those defendants whom Nu Image had "good
cause" to believe resided within the District of Columbia. 129 In support
of this holding, the court further stated that it must consider the "delay
and unproductive utilization of court resources" in prosecuting a lawsuit
in which the vast majority of defendants would have to be dismissed
after discovery revealed that they did not reside in the District of Columbia. 130
[I]n deciding whether a request comes within the discovery
rules, a court is not required to blind itself to the purpose for
which a party seeks information. Thus, when the purpose of a
discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied. 131
This decision prompted Nu Image to voluntarily abandon the suit
against the twenty thousand odd defendants, including the defendants
that did live in the District of Columbia. 132
The court's holding in Nu Image turned on an analysis of personal
jurisdiction, despite the fact that the Doe defendants had yet to be named

126
See id. at 345 (holding that Court is in no position to evaluate the defendants' specific connections with the District of Columbia, and that quashing subpoenas
would bar the plaintiffs :from obtaining discovery relevant to that evaluation).
127
See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (rejecting plaintiff's motion to take
leave for ex parte discovery).
128
Id. (citing Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
129
See id. (limiting the defendants that could be named in the suit).
130
See id. at 41 (taking into consideration efficient utilization of judicial
resources).
131
Id. (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 43 7 y.s. 340, 352 n.17
(1978)).
132
See The Expendables Makers Dismiss Massive BitTorrent Lawsuit,
TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 25, 2011), http://torrentfteak.com/the-expendables-makersdismiss-massive-bittorrent-lawsuit-l 10825/ (revealing that Nu Image dropped its suit
against all defendants upon court's refusal to grant jurisdictional discovery).
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Many John Doe defendants argue that the copyright holders' subpoenas requesting the defendants' identifying information should be
quashed on the basis that the defendants were improperly joined into a
single action. 140 Permissive joinder, governed by Rule 20 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that individuals:
may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to
relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B)
any question oflaw or fact common to all defendants will arise
141
in the action.
"The purpose of Rule 20 is 'to promote trial convenience and expedite the final resolution of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits,
extra expense to the parties, and loss of time to the court as well as the
litigants appearing before it. "' 142 The Supreme Court has indicated that
the rules ofj oinder are to be broadly construed and has stated that ') oin143
der of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." Where
j oinder is found to be inappropriate, the remedy is not dismissal of the
action, but rather, dropping parties to the suit and severing claims against
those parties in accordance with Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil
144
Procedure.
Although the Supreme Court takes a favorable stance towards joinder, judges have the discretion to sever and dismiss defendants to avoid
causing prejudice and unfairness to the defendants--even if the court
found that j oinder of the John Does met the requirements of Rule
20(a). 145 For example, the court in Hard Drive Productions, Inc. v. Does
1-188 chose to exercise discretion and severed all but one defendant,
See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *4 (asking court to findjoinder improper and sever defendants).
141 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2).
142 West Coast, 275 F.R.D at 15 (quoting M.K. v. Tenet, 216 F.R.D. 133, 137
140

(D.D.C. 2002)).
143 See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure
in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1049, 1108 (2008) (quoting United
Mineworkers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)).
144 See FED. R. CIV. P. 21. See Voltage Pictures, at *4 (explaining that improper joinder is only remedied by severance of defendants rather than dismissal of
suit).

145 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (noting that even ifrequirements of
Rule 20(a) are met, "court[s] must examine whether permissible joinder would 'comport with the principles of fundamental fairness' or would result in prejudice to either
side."' (quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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Many John Doe defendants argue that the copyright holders' subpoenas requesting the defendants' identifying information should be
quashed on the basis that the defendants were improperly joined into a
single action. 140 Permissive joinder, governed by Rule 20 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that individuals:
may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to
relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B)
any question oflaw or fact common to all defendants will arise
in the action. 141
·
"The purpose of Rule 20 is 'to promote trial convenience and expedite the final resolution of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits,
extra expense to the parties, and loss of time to the court as well as the
litigants appearing before it. '" 142 The Supreme Court has indicated that
the rules ofj oinder are to be broadly construed and has stated that ') oin143
der of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." Where
joinder is found to be inappropriate, the remedy is not dismissal of the
action, but rather, dropping parties to the suit and severing claims against
those parties in accordance with Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil
144
Procedure.
Although the Supreme Court takes a favorable stance towards joinder, judges have the discretion to sever and dismiss defendants to avoid
causing prejudice and unfairness to the defendants--even if the court
found that j oinder of the John Does met the requirements of Rule
20(a). 145 For example, the court in Hard Drive Productions, Inc. v. Does
1-188 chose to exercise discretion and severed all but one defendant,
See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *4 (asking court to findjoinder improper and sever defendants).
141 FED. R. Crv. P. 20(a)(2).
142 West Coast, 275 F.R.D at 15 (quoting M.K. v. Tenet, 216 F.R.D. 133, 137
(D.D.C. 2002)).
143 See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure
in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1049, 1108 (2008) (quoting United
Mineworkers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)).
144 See FED. R. C1v. P. 21. See Voltage Pictures, at *4 (explaining that improper joinder is only remedied by severance of defendants rather than dismissal of
suit).
145 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (noting that even ifrequirements of
Rule 20(a) are met, "court[s] must examine whether permissible joinder would 'comport with the principles of fundamental fairness' or would result in prejudice to either
side."' (quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000)).
140
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providing three justifications for doing so. 146 First, the court reasoned
that permittingjoinder "would undermine Rule 20(a)'s purpose ofpromotingjudicial economy and trial convenience because it would result in
a logistically unmanageable case." 147 Second, permittingjoinder would
force the court to address each defendant's unique defenses, resulting in
various "mini-trials" involving different evidence and testimony. 148 Lastly, the court noted that permissive joinder does not comport with "notions of fundamental fairness," and that j oinder would likely cause prejudice to putative defendants. 149
Aside from judges' discretionary decisions to sever the defendants,
BitTorrent's rise in popularity has given cause for many courts to deal
with the question of whether the joinder of John Doe defendants who
engage in infringing activity using BitTorrent should be treated the same
way as joinder of defendants in earlier P2P file sharing cases. 150 In previous file-sharing cases dealing with earlier P2P networks, courts commonly held that the defendants' mere use of the same P2P network was
insufficient to permit joinder of defendants. 151 Despite this body of case
law, some courts have distinguished BitTorrent from earlier P2P networks. and have permitted the j oinder of those defendants who were part
of a pa..-rticular BitTorrent "swarm." 152 These courts differentiated Bit146

See id. at *14 ("Even ifjoinder of the Doe Defendants ... met the requirements of Rule 20(a) ... , the Court finds it is appropriate to exercise its discretion
to sever and dismiss all but one Doe Defendant to avoid causing prejudice and unfairness to Defendants, and in the interest of justice.").
147
See id. (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. l lC Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 23233 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)) (providing an example when the court held that courtrooms
cannot accommodate large numbers of defendants, and that their attorneys could not
try all of the plaintiff's claims together).
148
See id. (predicting that there may be ISP specific defenses since thirteen
different ISPs are associated with Doe defendants in this trial).
149
See id. (describing logistical problems arising from joinder of all defendants).
150

See id. (acknowledging question raised by use ofBitTorrent file-sharing
and that district courts have answered this question inconsistently).
151 s
ee Laface Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL
544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) ("[M]erely committing the same type of
violation in the same way does not link defendants together for purposes ofjoinder.");
see also BMG Music v. Does 1-4, No. 3:06-cv-01579-MHP, 2006 US. Dist. LEXIS
53237, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2006) (holding that the defendants' use of the same
P2P network and ISP to infringe the plaintiff's copyright was not sufficient to allow
joinder of the defendants); see also Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, No. 6:04-cv197-0rl-22DAB, 2004 US. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at *JO (MD. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004) (finding that the defendants' use of the same P2P network, FastTrack, was insufficient to
permitjoinder).
152

See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (discussing differences in district
courts' determinations of whether BitTorrent users should be joined under Fed. R.
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Torrent from other P2P networks on the basis that BitTorrent "makes
every downloader also an uploader of the illegally transferred file(s)." 153
Conversely, several courts rejected this distinction and have held that the
mere use ofBitTorrent, similar to previous P2P technologies, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 20(a), even if the defendants
. l e " swarm. ,, 154
were part of a smg
Courts that permit j oinder in mass file sharing lawsuits emphasize
that the requirements for permissive joinder under Rule 20 set forth a
flexible test, and that courts should seek the broadest possible scope of
action. 155 For example, the court in Voltage Pictures held that Rule
20(a)(2)(A) "essentially requires claims asserted against joined parties to
be 'logically related. "' 156 Viewing Rule 20(a)'s requirements broadly,
courts that allow j oinder further note that severing defendants would
pose significant obstacles for copyright holders to protect their copyrights from file-sharers. 157 Preventingjoinder of defendants in file sharing cases would not only force copyright holders to file individual lawCiv. P. 20(a)); see also MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-18, 2011WL2181620, at *l (N.D.
Cal. June 2, 2011) (noting that while joinder may be found improper later in litigation, allegation that Does infringed plaintiff's copyright through BitTorrent was sufficient to satisfy Rule 20(a) at pleading stage); see also Voltage Pictures, WL 1807438,
at *5 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (holding that "the impulse is toward entertaining the
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; [and] joinder
of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged" (quoting United Mine Workers of Am., v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)); see also Call of the Wild Movie, 770
F. Supp. 2d at 347; see also West Coast Prods., 275 F.R.D. at 14 (discussing that
defendants are properly joined since they participated in a transaction to download a
movie using the BitTorrent file sharing protocol).
153
E.g., Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (internal quotation
omitted).
154
See Hard Drive, 2011WL3740473, at *13-14 (holding that permissive
joinder of all defendants is improper even if defendants were in same swarm); see
also Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011WL3652521, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (holding that the nature ofBitTorrent protocol does not
justify joinder of otherwise unrelated defendants); see also IO Group, Inc. v. Does 119, No. C 10-03851 SI, 2010 WL 5071605, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (holding
joinder improper where the only connection between infringing parties is their use of
the same P2P network); see also LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *2 (severing
claims against users of P2P network used to commit copyright infringement since
there was no assertion that the defendants acted in concert); see also Elektra Entm 't
Group, 2004 WL 2095581, at *l, *6-7 (holding that the mere use o~P2P pr~tocol w~s
not sufficient to show that the plaintiff's copyright infringement claims agamst multiple P2P users were sufficiently related for purposes of Rule· 20(a)(2)).
155
See Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL 1807438, at *5 (establishing broad test for
allowing joinder).
156
Id. (other citations omitted).
157
See Call of the Wild, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344
(D.D.C. 2011) (examining the difficulties that severance would pose for copyright
holders).
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providing three justifications for doing so. 146 First, the court reasoned
that permitting j oinder "would undermine Rule 20(a)' s purpose of promoting judicial economy and trial convenience because it would result in
a logistically unmanageable case." 147 Second, permittingjoinder would
force the court to address each defendant's unique defenses, resulting in
various "mini-trials" involving different evidence and testimony. 148 Lastly, the court noted that permissive joinder does not comport with "notions of fundamental fairness," and that j oinder would likely cause prejudice to putative defendants. 149
Aside from judges' discretionary decisions to sever the defendants,
BitTorrent's rise in popularity has given cause for many courts to deal
with the question of whether the j oinder of John Doe defendants who
engage in infringing activity using BitTorrent should be treated the same
way as joinder of defendants in earlier P2P file sharing cases. 150 In previous file-sharing cases dealing with earlier P2P networks, courts commonly held that the defendants' mere use of the same P2P network was
insufficient to permit joinder of defendants. 151 Despite this body of case
law, some courts have distinguished BitTorrent from earlier P2P networks. and have permitted the j oinder of those defendants who were part
of a pa..-rticular BitTorrent "swarm." 152 These courts differentiated Bit146

See id. at *14 ("Even if joinder of the Doe Defendants ... met the requirements of Rule 20(a) ... , the Court finds it is appropriate to exercise its discretion
to sever and dismiss all but one Doe Defendant to avoid causing prejudice and unfairness to Defendants, and in the interest of justice.").
147
See id. (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. I IC Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 23233 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)) (providing an example when the court held that courtrooms
cannot accommodate large numbers of defendants, and that their attorneys could not
try all of the plaintiff's claims together).
148
See id. (predicting that there may be ISP specific defenses since thirteen
different ISPs are associated with Doe defendants in this trial).
149
See id. (describing logistical problems arising from joinder of all defendants).
150
See id. (acknowledging question raised by use ofBitTorrent file-sharing
and that district courts have answered this question inconsistently).
151 (Y
0ee LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL
544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008) ("[M]erely committing the same type of
violation in the same way does not link defendants together for purposes ofjoinder.");
see also BMG Music v. Does 1-4, No. 3:06-cv-01579-MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53237, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2006) (holding that the defendants' use of the same
P2P network and ISP to infringe the plaintiff's copyright was not sufficient to allow
joinder of the defendants); see also Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, No. 6:04-cv197-0rl-22DAB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at *JO (MD. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004) (finding that the defendants' use of the same P2P network, FastTrack, was insufficient to
permitjoinder).
152
See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (discussing differences in district
courts' determinations of whether BitTorrent users should be joined under Fed. R.
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Torrent from other P2P networks on the basis that BitTorrent "makes
every downloader also an uploader of the illegallytransferredfile(s)." 153
Conversely, several courts rejected this distinction and have held that the
mere use ofBitTorrent, similar to previous P2P technologies, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 20(a), even if the defendants
. 1e " swarm. "154
were part of a smg
Courts that permit j oinder in mass file sharing lawsuits emphasize
that the requirements for permissive joinder under Rule 20 set forth a
flexible test, and that courts should seek the broadest possible scope of
action. 155 For example, the court in Voltage Pictures held that Rule
20(a)(2)(A) "essentially requires claims asserted against joined parties to
be 'logically related. "' 156 Viewing Rule 20(a)'s requirements broadly,
courts that allow j oinder further note that severing defendants would
pose significant obstacles for copyright holders to protect their copyrights from file-sharers. 157 Preventingjoinder of defendants in file sharing cases would not only force copyright holders to file individual lawCiv. P. 20(a)); see also MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-18, 2011WL2181620, at *I (N.D.
Cal. June 2, 2011) (noting that while joinder may be found improper later in litigation, allegation that Does infringed plaintiff's copyright through BitTorrent was sufficient to satisfy Rule 20(a) at pleading stage); see also Voltage Pictures, WL 1807438,
at *5 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) (holding that "the impulse is toward entertaining the
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; [and] joinder
of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged" (quoting United Mine Workers of Am., v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)); see also Call of the Wild Movie, 770
F. Supp. 2d at 347; see also West Coast Prods., 275 F.R.D. at 14 (discussing that
defendants are properly joined since they participated in a transaction to download a
movie using the BitTorrent file sharing protocol).
153
E.g., Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (internal quotation
omitted).
154
See Hard Drive, 2011WL3740473, at *13-14 (holding that permissive
joinder of all defendants is improper even if defendants were in same swarm); see
also Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011WL3652521, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (holding that the nature ofBitTorrent protocol does not
justify joinder of otherwise unrelated defendants); see also IO Group, Inc. v. Does 119, No. C 10-03851 SI, 2010 WL 5071605, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (holding
joinder improper where the only connection between infringing parties is their use of
the same P2P network); see also LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *2 (severing
claims against users of P2P network used to commit copyright infringement since
there was no assertion that the defendants acted in concert); see also Elektra Entm 't
Group, 2004 WL 2095581, at *I, *6-7 (holding that the mere use ofP2P protocol was
not sufficient to show that the plaintiff's copyright infringement claims against multiple P2P users were sufficiently related for purposes of Rule' 20(a)(2)).
155
See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *5 (establishing broad test for
allowing joinder).
156
Id. (other citations omitted).
157
See Call of the Wild, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344
(D.D.C. 2011) (examining the difficulties that severance would pose for copyright
holders).
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suits against each infringer, it would also require the copyright holders to
issue separate subpoenas to ISPs for each defendant's identifying infor158
mation. Additionally, copyright holders would have to pay separate
filing fees for each individual case. 159 Consequently, it is "highly unlikely" that copyright holders could protect their copyrights in a cost160
effective manner. However, one court that permitted j oinder conceded
that "at some point, the sheer number of putative defendants involved in
a single case may necessitate severance." 161
Espousing the view that j oinder of BitTorrent file-sharers is improper, the court in Diabolic Video Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-2099 held
that j oinder was improper even where the defendants were part of the
162
same "swarm." The court inDiabolic analyzed the cases allowing for
joinder of John Doe defendants and observed that in each of the cases
allowing for joinder of the defendants, the courts relied on the proposition that a file sharing protocol like BitTorrent "makes every downloader
also an uploader of the illegally transferred file(s)." 163 In rejecting this
distinction, the court in Diabolic stated that courts allowingjoinder fail
to explain how or why the technical architecture of BitTorrent is any
different from the file sharing protocols considered in previous P2P file
sharing cases such as LaFace Records, Intersco'Pe Records or BMG
164
'
Music. In each of these cases, the mere fact that the defendants used
the same ISP and P2P file sharing protocol was held insufficient to justify joinder of otherwise unrelated defendants in a single action. 165
158

See id. (noting inconvenience to copyright holders in managing individual
lawsuits against each John Doe defendant).
159
See id. (considering the financial burden that would be placed on the copyright holder in paying separate filing fees for suits against each individual defendant).
160
See id. at 345 (findingjoinder proper so that copyright holders can efficiently and cost effectively protect their copyrights).
161
See Voltage Pictures, 2011-WL 1807438, at *8 (recognizing administrative burdens on court and judicial economy posed by the number of putative defendants).
162
See Diabolic, 2011 WL 3100404, at *4 (indicating that the allegation that
defendants participated in the same swarm is not sufficient to permit joinder).
163
Id. (observing the rationale employed by courts permitting joinder of defendants who engaged in copyright infringement via BitTorrent); see also Call of the
Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 342-43.
164
See Diabolic, 2011WL3100404, at *4 (listing cases in which the defendants' use of previous P2P networks was not sufficient to permitjoinder between otherwise unrelated defendants).
165
See LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *3 (holding that defendants'
use of same ISP and P2P network, without more, was insufficient to permitjoinder
under Rule 20); see also BMG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53237, at *5-6, (severing
defendants sua sponte where the connection between the defendants was merely the
use of the same ISP to engage in infringing activity); see also Interscope Records,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2 7782, at *10 (holding that joinder of defendants is improper
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Further, courts finding joinder improper, have noted that although
plaintiffs place an emphasis on the fact that the defendants were in the
same swarm, plaintiffs' exhibits attached to their complaint generally
indicate the activity of the different IP addresses occurred on different
days, and at different times, making the allegation that the John Does
acted in concert far less persuasive. 166 Similarly, one court concluded
that the plaintiffs allegation that John Doe defendants met Rule 20(a)'s
joinder requirements was speculative and conclusory since plaintiff asserted that "each defendant is a possible source of the Plaintiffs' file, and
may be held responsible for distributing the file to the other defendt "167
ans.

IV. RESOLVING PROCEDURAL ISSUES
As many courts have recognized, John Doe lawsuits are the copyright holder's only means of recourse against the massive onset of
168
online copyright infringement facilitated by P2P networks. The
inapplicability of the DMCA § 512(h) subpoena, which would allow
for identification of the defendants prior to filing suit, necessitates the
filing of John Doe lawsuits. 169 Moreover, the DMCA safe harbor provisions shelter ISPs from any liability for infringing activity over P2P
170
networks, leaving copyright holders without recourse against ISPs.
Lastly, the decentralized nature of P2P networks makes it unlikely
that copyright holders could successfully bring action against the parent corporation of the P2P network since the central servers do not
171
store the copyrighted content, as N apster did.

where defendants merely used the same P2P network to engage in copyright infringement).
166
See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (commenting that although defendants may have participated in the same swarm, it is likely that each user's file sharing
activity occurred at different times on different days).
167
Id. at *15 (emphasizing uncertainty related to plaintiffs theory of concerted action required for joinder of defendants under Rule 20).
168
See supra note 89 and accompanying text for a discussion of copyright
holders' limited means of recovery against file sharers.
169
See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of a DMCA
section 512(h) subpoena as applied in mass file sharing lawsuits.
170
See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text for
a discussion of how ISPs are protected from liability for infringing activity of their
subscribers.
171
See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
how BitTorrent' s architecture protects the parent corporation from infringement
claims.
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suits against each infringer, it would also require the copyright holders to
issue separate subpoenas to ISPs for each defendant's identifying infor158
mation. Additionally, copyright holders would have to pay separate
filing fees for each individual case. 159 Consequently, it is "highly unlikely" that copyright holders could protect their copyrights in a cost160
effective manner. However, one court that permitted joinder conceded
that "at some point, the sheer number of putative defendants involved in
a single case may necessitate severance." 161
Espousing the view that j oinder of BitTorrent file-sharers is improper, the court in Diabolic Video Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-2099 held
that joinder was improper even where the defendants were part of the
162
same "swarm." The court inDiabolic analyzed the cases allowing for
joinder of John Doe defendants and observed that in each of the cases
allowing for joinder of the defendants, the courts relied on the proposition that a file sharing protocol like BitTorrent "makes every downloader
also an uploader of the illegally transferred file(s)." 163 In rejecting this
distinction, the court in Diabolic stated that courts allowingjoinder fail
to explain how or why the technical architecture of BitTorrent is any
different from the file sharing protocols considered in previous P2P file
sharing cases such as LaFace Records, Intersco'Pe Records or BMG
164
'
Music. In each of these cases, the mere fact that the defendants used
the same ISP and P2P file sharing protocol was held insufficient to justify joinder of otherwise unrelated defendants in a single action. 165
158

See id. (noting inconvenience to copyright holders in managing individual
lawsuits against each John Doe defendant).
159
See id. (considering the financial burden that would be placed on the copyright holder in paying separate filing fees for suits against each individual defendant).
160
See id. at 345 (findingjoinder proper so that copyright holders can efficiently and cost effectively protect their copyrights).
161
See Voltage Pictures, 2011-WL 1807438, at *8 (recognizing administrative burdens on court and judicial economy posed by the number of putative defendants).
162
See Diabolic, 2011 WL 3100404, at *4 (indicating that the allegation that
defendants participated in the same swarm is not sufficient to permit joinder).
163
Id. (observing the rationale employed by courts permitting joinder of defendants who engaged in copyright infringement via BitTorrent); see also Call of the
Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 342-43.
164
See Diabolic, 2011WL3100404, at *4 (listing cases in which the defendants' use of previous P2P networks was not sufficient to permitjoinder between otherwise unrelated defendants).
165
See LaFace Records, 2008 WL 544992, at *3 (holding that defendants'
use of same ISP and P2P network, without more, was insufficient to permit joinder
under Rule 20); see also BMG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53237, at *5-6, (severing
defendants sua sponte where the connection between the defendants was merely the
use of the same ISP to engage in infringing activity); see also Interscope Records,
2004 US. Dist. LEXIS 2 7782, at *10 (holding that joinder of defendants is improper
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Further, courts finding joinder improper, have noted that although
plaintiffs place an emphasis on the fact that the defendants were in the
same swarm, plaintiffs' exhibits attached to their complaint generally
indicate the activity of the different IP addresses occurred on different
days, and at different times, making the allegation that the John Does
166
acted in concert far less persuasive. Similarly, one court concluded
that the plaintiffs allegation that John Doe defendants met Rule 20(a)' s
joinder requirements was speculative and conclusory si~ce_ pl~intiff asserted that "each defendant is a possible source of the Plamtiffs file, and
may be held responsible for distributing the file to the other defend,,167
t
ans.

IV. RESOLVING PROCEDURAL ISSUES
As many courts have recognized, John Doe lawsuits are the copyright holder's only means of recourse against the massive onset of
168
online copyright infringement facilitated by P2P networks. The
inapplicability of the DMCA § 512(h) subpoena, which would allow
for identification of the defendants prior to filing suit, necessitates the
filing of John Doe lawsuits. 169 Moreover, the DMCA safe harbor provisions shelter ISPs from any liability for infringing activity over P2P
170
networks, leaving copyright holders without recourse against ISPs.
Lastly, the decentralized nature of P2P networks makes it unlikely
that copyright holders could successfully bring action against the parent corporation of the P2P network since the central servers do not
store the copyrighted content, as N apster d1'd. 171

where defendants merely used the same P2P network to engage in copyright infringement).
166
See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (commenting that although defendants may have participated in the same swarm, it is likely that each user's file sharing
activity occurred at different times on different days).
167
Id. at *15 (emphasizing uncertainty related to plaintiff's theory of concerted action required for joinder of defendants under Rule 20).
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See supra note 89 and accompanying text for a discussion of copyright
holders' limited means of recovery against file sharers.
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See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of a DMCA
section 512(h) subpoena as applied in mass file sharing lawsuits.
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See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text for
a discussion of how ISPs are protected from liability for infringing activity of their
subscribers.
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how BitTorrent's architecture protects the parent corporation from infringement
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. John Doe laws~ts are a burdensome means of resolution for cop-

yright holders seeking redress against infringers and are "time consuming[,] ... cumbersome and expensive." 172 Given this difficult
state of affairs, it is troubling to copyright holders that even John Doe
lawsuits encounter a gamut of procedural objections that various
173
courts have sustained. fu addition to judicial resistance to the mass
file sharing law.suits, media reports of the John Doe lawsuits are largely unsympathetic to the problems of copyright holders. 174 The mass
suits against thousands of defendants have been likened to judicially
sponsored extortion and derided as "fishing expeditions." 175 It is important for courts to be cognizant of this background when detennining procedural questions raised in the mass file-sharing lawsuits since
the resolution of procedural matters has significant effects on both
copyright holders' ability to recover against file-sharers, and on filesharers' privacy rights. 176

A. When to Address Personal Jurisdiction
. . D.efendants. c~mmon!y raise defenses based on a lack of personal
JDnsdiction, clamung to lack the required "minimum contacts" with
the forum to defeat personal jurisdiction. 177 fu addressing these defenses, many courts have held that copyright holders should be allowed to conduct discovery of defendants' identifying infonnation
prior to addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction. 178 The court in
17

~ S~e

Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL 1807438, at *8 (quoting In re Charter
Commumcalions Inc., Subpoena Enfurcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 782 (8th Cir.
2005) (Murphy, J., dissenting)).
173

See id at *7-8 (observing that courts have varying thresholds for the exercise of
to sever defendants, and that courts must weigh the administrative
burdens agamst the challenges presented to copyright holders in protecting their
works).
.

d1scr~t10n

174

See Jonathan Berr, "The Hurt Locker" Producers Launch Lawsuit Attack
Against Pirates, DAILY FINANCE (May 12, 201 OJ (questioning whether piracy has
actually resulted m revenue losses at the box office and suggesting that these suits
may cause public backlash).
175
An
derson, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
176 iJee
See supra notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
in "
p· y·
v·d
iJee, e.g., rrst IIDe 1 eos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011
WL 3498227, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (submitting affidavits indicating that the
defendants
do not have sufficient contacts with the forum necessary to establish personal
jurisdiction).
(Y

178

See id at *9 (announcing that lack of personal jurisdiction cannot be raised
until after defendants are named as parties); see also Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL
18074 3 8, at *9 (
that until. the plaintiffu have been given an opportunity to
discover defendants 1denlifying mfonnation, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction Is improper); see also West Coast, 275 F.R.D. at 14-15 (holding that prior to
•

fin~ing
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Nu Image departed from this line of cases ~n~ re~sed to ~llow the
laintiffs to discover the defendants' ident1fymg mformat10n because
fhe plaintiffs lacked a good faith belief \hat the court would have personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 7 Despite the dec1s10n reached
in Nu Image, personal jurisdiction is properly addressed only a~~r
copyright holders have had a chance to discover the defendants iden18
tifying information. °First, copyright hol~ers mer~ly know the defendants' IP addresses, and without more informat10n, courts hav~ no
way to evaluate the defendants' jurisdictional defen~es and have .1u1:1ited information
to assess alternative bases to establish. persona! Juris181
diction. If and when putative defendants are named m the smt? t~e
defendants
will then have the opportunity to challenge personal Juris182
diction. Second, at least one court has observed that movants generally assume they will be named as defendants once their identifying
183
information is discovered. However, many movants have argued
that their internet connection was used by third parties to infringe the
Plaintiff copyright holder's work; therefore, it is those third parties
who should be properly named as defendants. 184 p·maIIy, one co~mentator has argued that evaluating personal jurisdiction prior to 1d~n
tifying the defendants is based on the idea that defendants can subIDit
affidavits swearing to their lack of contact with the forum. 185 Affidaidentification of defendants, defenses based on personal jurisdiction are premature);
see also Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48 (in?icati~g that court~ and
parties are in no position to evaluate each defen~ants' connection with the ~ssociated
forum prior to discovery of identifying informat10n); see also El~ktra Entm t ~roup,
Inc. v. Does 1-9, 2004 WL 2095581, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (statmg that a rulmg on
personal jurisdiction at this stage is prematur~); ~ee_ a~so ~any M_usic, 326 F. Supp. 2d
at 567 ("A holding at this stage that personal 3unsd1ct10n is lackmg would be premature."). 179
· ·
d"
See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (limiting the_plamt~ff's iscovery
request to just those defendants which plaintiff had a good faith behefwould be subject to the court's jurisdiction).
.
180
See
infra
notes
181-190
and
accompanymg
text.
181
See Call of the Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (declaring tha~ ~valu~ti~g
personal jurisdiction is premature prior to discovery of the defendants identifying
information).
182

See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *9 (con:rnen.tin!S th.at deferringon addressing personal jurisdiction until after discovery of ident1.fyi?g_m~or
mation 183
still allows defendants the opportunity to challenge personal 3unsd1ct10n).
See West Coast, 275 F.R.D. at 14 (observing that movants assume they
will be 184
named in the suit once their identifying information is release~). .
See id. (stating that third parties would be properly named~ ~mt).
185
See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Czvzl Pr~c~dure
in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1049, 1.10.0 (2.008) (re~ogmzmg that
evaluating personal jurisdiction before discov_efJ'.' of ide~t1fying mformat~on would
rely on defendants providing affidavits estabhshmg their lack of connection to forum).
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John Doe lawsuits are a burdensome means of resolution for copyright holders seeking redress against infringers and are "time consuming[,] ... cumbersome and expensive." 172 Given this difficult
state of affairs, it is troubling to copyright holders that even John Doe
lawsuits encounter a gamut of procedural objections that various
courts have sustained. 173 In addition to judicial resistance to the mass
file sharing lawsuits, media reports of the John Doe lawsuits are largely unsympathetic to the problems of copyright holders. 174 The mass
suits against thousands of defendants have been likened to judicially
sponsored extortion and derided as "fishing expeditions." 175 It is important for courts to be cognizant of this background when determining procedural questions raised in the mass file-sharing lawsuits since
the resolution of procedural matters has significant effects on both
copyright holders' ability to recover against file-sharers, and on filesharers' privacy rights. 176

A. When to Address Personal Jurisdiction
Defendants commonly raise defenses based on a lack of personal
jurisdiction, claiming to lack the required "minimum contacts" with
the forum to defeat personal jurisdiction. 177 In addressing these defenses, many courts have held that copyright holders should be allowed to conduct discovery of defendants' identifying information
prior to addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction. 178 The court in
172
See Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL 1807438, at *8 (quoting In re Charter
Communications Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 782 (8th Cir.
2005) (Murphy, J., dissenting)).
173
See id. at *7-8 (observing that courts have varying thresholds for the exercise of discretion to sever defendants, and that courts must weigh the administrative
burdens against the challenges presented to copyright holders in protecting their
works).
174
See Jonathan Berr, "The Hurt Locker" Producers Launch Lawsuit Attack
Against Pirates, DAILY FINANCE (May 12, 2010) (questioning whether piracy has
actually resulted in revenue losses at the box office and suggesting that these suits
may cause public backlash).
175
See Anderson, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
176
See supra notes 168-17 5 and accompanying text.
177
See, e.g., First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, No. 10 C 6254, 2011
WL 3498227, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (submitting affidavits indicating that the
defendants do not have sufficient contacts with the forum necessary to establish personal jurisdiction).
178
See id. at *9 (announcing that lack of personal jurisdiction cannot be raised
until after defendants are named as parties); see also Voltage Pictures, 2011 WL
1807438, at *9 (finding that until the plaintiffs have been given an opportunity to
discover defendants' identifying information, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is improper); see also West Coast, 275 F.R.D. at 14-15 (holding that prior to
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Nu Image departed from this line of cases and refused to allow the
plaintiffs to discover the defendants' identifying information because
the plaintiffs lacked a good faith belief that the court would have personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 179 Despite the decision reached
in Nu Image, personal jurisdiction is properly addressed only after
copyright holders have had a chance to discover the defendants' identifying information. 18°First, copyright holders merely know the defendants' IP addresses, and without more information, courts have no
way to evaluate the defendants' jurisdictional defenses and have limited information to assess alternative bases to establish personal jurisdiction. 181 If and when putative defendants are named in the suit, the
defendants will then have the opportunity to challenge personal jurisdiction. 182 Second, at least one court has observed that movants generally assume they will be named as defendants once their identifying
information is discovered. 183 However, many movants have argued
that their internet connection was used by third parties to infringe the
plaintiff copyright holder's work; therefore, it is those third parties
184
who should be properly named as defendants. Finally, one commentator has argued that evaluating personal jurisdiction prior to identifying the defendants is based on the idea that defendants can submit
185
affidavits swearing to their lack of contact with the forum. Affidaidentification of defendants, defenses based on personal jurisdiction are premature);
see also Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48 (indicating that courts and
parties are in no position to evaluate each defendants' connection with the associated
forum prior to discovery of identifying information); see also Elektra Entm't Group,
Inc. v. Does 1-9, 2004 WL 2095581, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that a ruling on
personal jurisdiction at this stage is premature); see also Sony Music, 326 F. Supp. 2d
at 567 ("A holding at this stage that personal jurisdiction is lacking would be premature.").
179 See Nu Image, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (limiting the plaintiff's discovery
request to just those defendants which plaintiff had a good faith belief would be subject to the court's jurisdiction).
180
See infra notes 181-190 and accompanying text.
181 See Call of the Wild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (declaring that evaluating
personal jurisdiction is premature prior to discovery of the defendants' identifying
information).
182 See Voltage Pictures, 2011WL1807438, at *9 (commenting that deferringon addressing personal jurisdiction until after discovery of identifying information still allows defendants the opportunity to challenge personal jurisdiction).
183 See West Coast, 275 F.R.D. at 14 (observing that movants assume they
will be named in the suit once their identifying information is released).
184 See id. (stating that third parties would be properly named in suit).
185 See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure
in Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1049, 1100 (2008) (recognizing that
evaluating personal jurisdiction before discovery of identifying information would
rely on defendants providing affidavits establishing their lack of connection to forum).
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vits swearing a lack of connection to the forum, however, are open to
abuse by anonymous defendants who simply wish to be dropped from
the suit and deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to explore connections the defendants may have to the forum that they did not themselves consider. 186
Those who argue in favor of addressing personal jurisdiction prior
to discovery of the defendants' identifying information suggest that
plaintiffs do not have a "good faith" belief that the court will have
personal jurisdiction. 187 Defendants have argued that copyright holders can establish a good faith belief by utilizing geolocational technology, which helps detect an individual's location based on their IP ad188
dress. Courts reject this method of establishing a good faith belief
because geolocational technology only reveals where a defendant is
likely to be located. 189 Further, publicly available geolocational technology is not completely accurate, and therefore does not resolve the
question of whether personal jurisdiction is proper. 190

B. The Division Over Joinder
An important split in the case law ofBitTorrent file sharing lawsuits involves whether joinder of the defendants is appropriate. 191 This
split needs to be resolved so copyright holders can plan their litigation
strategy; otherwise, copyright holders will default to joining defendants due to the potential convenience and cost efficiency, roll the dice,
and hope the judge will not elect to sever the defendants. 192 One
school of thought holds that, similar to previous P2P networks, the
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mere fact that the defendants all used the same P2P network is not
enough to permitjoinder. 193 Conversely, several courts have differentiated BitTorrent from previous P2P networks based on the basis that
all users who download content on BitTorrent automatically become
up loaders of that same content, and as such, all defendants are engaged in the same transaction as required by the rules of permissive
.. d 194
JOlll er.
Ultimately, courts should hold thatjoinder of defendants is improper.195 Several courts have already reached this conclusion and this
result is properly achieved through either an analysis of the requirements of permissive joinder, or as an exercise of judicial discretion in
196
favor of fundamental fairness to defendants.
Peers sharing files in a BitTorrent swarm do not meet the re197
quirements of permissive joinder set forth in Rule 20. Several courts
that have dealt with copyright infringement via previous P2P networks have held that joinder is not proper merely because defendants
used the same P2P network. 198 "[C]omitting the same type of violation in the same way does not link defendants together for the purposes of joinder." 199Although some courts have accepted the assertion
that BitTorrent requires a greater degree of interactivity between peers
than previous P2P networks, this attempted distinction is unavailing. 200 Courts have rejected this distinction and have specifically held
that the nature ofBitTorrent file sharing protocol does not make join193
194
195

See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 152-161 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 196-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying

text.
186

See id. at 1100-03 (discussing problems with defendants affidavits regarding connection to forum).
187
See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332,
346 (D.D.C. 2011) (arguing against allowance of discovery based on the lack of a
good faith belief).
188
See id. (referencing reverse domain name service look-up and the American Registry for Internet Numbers as tools to reveal where an IP address is physically
located).
189
See id. at 347 (observing that available tools that help to find the physical
location of the IP address are not entirely accurate).
190
See id. (criticizing the uncertainty in using IP lookup tools because they
provide only the likely location of defendants).
191
For a further discussion of the split in case law regarding the joinder of
defendants in mass file sharing lawsuits, see supra notes 150-154 and accompanying
text.
192
See Allan Gregory, The Economics of (Killing) Mass BitTorrent Lawsuits,
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 18, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/the-economics-of-killingmass-bittorrent-lawsuits-l 10918) (explaining the incentive for copyright holders to
file single suits naming large numbers of defendants in order to minimize court fees).

196
See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (severing the defendants where
they were engaged in downloading copyrighted files using BitTorrent); see also Boy
Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011WL3652521, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 19, 2011) (concluding that joinder of defendants using BitTorrent was improper); see also Pac. Centuryint'l Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-11-02533-(DMR), 2011
WL 2690142, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (holding thatjoinder is inappropriate
where all the defendants downloaded the same file using BitTorrent); see also Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011WL3100404
(N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (disallowingjoinder based merely on the defendants' use of
BitTorrent to download the same file); see also Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Does 1-21,
No. 11-2258 SC, 2011WL1812786, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2011) (ruling that
joinder of BitTorrent users distributing a file within the same swarm was improper).
197
For a discussion of cases that found joinder of file sharing defendants
improper, see supra notes 162-167 and accompanying text.
198
See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
199
LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL
544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008).
200
See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs do not have a "good faith" belief that the court will have
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school of thought holds that, similar to previous P2P networks, the
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188 See id. (referencing reverse domain name service look-up and the American Registry for Internet Numbers as tools to reveal where an IP address is physically
located).
189 See id. at 347 (observing that available tools that help to find the physical
location of the IP address are not entirely accurate).
190 See id. (criticizing the uncertainty in using IP lookup tools because they
provide only the likely location of defendants).
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196 See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011
WL 3740473, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (severing the defendants where
they were engaged in downloading copyrighted files using BitTorrent); see also Boy
Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60, No. C 11-01738 SI, 2011WL3652521, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 19, 2011) (concluding thatjoinder of defendants using BitTorrent was improper); see also Pac. Century Int'l Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-11-02533-(DMR), 2011
WL 2690142, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (holding thatjoinder is inappropriate
where all the defendants downloaded the same file using BitTorrent); see also Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011WL3100404
(N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (disallowingjoinder based merely on the defendants' use of
BitTorrent to download the same file); see also Millennium TGA, Inc. v. Does 1-21,
No. 11-2258 SC, 2011WL1812786, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2011) (ruling that
joinder ofBitTorrent users distributing a file within the same swarm was improper).
197 For a discussion of cases that found joinder of file sharing defendants
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198 See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
199 Laface Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL
544992, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008).
200 See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
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der appropriate. 201 Courts have noted that the P2P networks at issue in
previous P2P file sharing cases were of precisely the same P2P architecture as BitTorrent. 202 Therefore, allegations that defendants participated in a single BitTorrent swarm, usually on different days and at
different times, are insufficient to make a valid claim of concerted
action necessary to justify joinder of defendants. 203
Regarding discretionary severance of defendants, courts have observed that, in mass file sharing cases, "[j]oinder ... fails to promote
trial convenience and expedition of the ultimate determination of ...
substantive issues ...." 204 This is in part due to the fact that the John
Does are likely to present different defenses, despite having engaged
in similar activities. 205 For example, "Comcast subscriber John Doe 1
could be an innocent parent whose internet access was abused by her
minor child, while John Doe 2 might share a computer with a roommate who infringed Plaintiffs' works. John Does 3 through 203 could
be thieves. " 206
Further, the reality of the file sharing lawsuits indicates that "the
vast majority of the claims ... are resolved through settlement once
the plaintiff secures information identifying the Does." 207 Generally,
file sharing cases go no further than the identification of John Doe
defendants since copyright holders have everything they need to affect
their goal of mass settlement. 208 Therefore, for most defendants, the

201
See Boy Racer, 2011 WL 3652521, at *3-4 (finding it improper to distinguish BitTorrent's architecture from other decentralized P2P networks); see also
Diabolic, 2011 WL 3100404, at *4 (holding that BitTorrent' s architecture is no different than that of previous P2P networks).
202
See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
203
See Boy Racer, 2011WL3652521, at *4 (finding that BitTorrent is of
same architecture as other P2P networks where courts have found joinder improper).
204
Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-58, No. C 11-02537 LB, 2011 WL
3443548 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011).
205
See id. (holding that although John Does engaged in similar activity in file
sharing copyrighted files, multiplicity of defenses raised by each defendant would
obscure benefits afforded by joining defendants in one suit); see also Hard Drive
Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, No. C-11-01566 JCS, 2011WL3740473, at *14 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (holding that addressing unique defenses raised by each defendant would result in mini-trials with different witnesses and evidence).
206
Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-58, 2011 WL 3443548, at *4 (citing
BMG Music v. Does 1-203, No. Civ.A. 04-650, 2004 WL 953888, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
2004)).
207
IO Group, Inc. v. Does 1-435, No. C 10-04382 SI, 2011WL445043, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011).
208
See Dickman, supra note 23, at 1111 (theorizing that plaintiffs should have
to cure procedural defects before continuing lawsuit).
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propriety of j oinder will never be addressed if courts defer that issue
until after identification. 209
[Copyright holders'] motive for seekingjoinder ... is to keep
[their] own litigation costs down in hopes that defendants will
accept a low initial settlement demand. However, filing one
mass action in order to identify hundreds of doe defendants
through pre-service discovery and facilitate mass settlement, is
not what the joinder rules were established for. 210
Courts tasked with adjudicating John Doe file sharing cases seem to
be trending towards finding j oinder inappropriate and severing defendants prior to identification of the John Doe defendants. 211 While some
courts defer deciding on the issue of j oinder until after the Does have
been identified, at least one commentator has observed that the identifying information of each defendant is oflittle to no use in assessingjoinder. 212 Determining whether a copyright holder's claims against multiple
defendants arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences can be evaluated based on information already known to copyright holders at the time of filing suit. 213
Courts adjudicating John Doe file sharing cases seem to be trending
toward findingj oinder inappropriate and severing anonymous defendants
prior to identification. 214 This protects defendants' identifying information, which may prevent copyright holders from distributing settle-

209

See id. (suggesting thatjoinder will not be addressed because defendants
do not choose to proceed to trial and argue their defenses).
210
IO Group, 2011WL445043, at *6.
211
See, e.g., Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865PSG 2011WL3100404, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (acknowledging that some
courts have deferred the question of joinder until after allowing plaintiff to take leave
for discovery but declining to follow such precedent).
212
See Dickman, supra note 208, at 1114 (suggesting that question ofmisjoinder should be decided at pleading level). But see Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does
1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011WL1807438, at *5 (D.D.C. 2011) (inquiring as to
propriety ofjoinder without John Doe defendants' identifying information).213 See
id. (noting plaintiff would know whether one defendant downloaded copyrighted
work from another defendant based on observing file sharing activity, regardless of
John Doe's identifying information).
213 See id. (noting plaintiff would know whether one defendant downloaded copyrighted work from another defendant based on observing file sharing activity, regardless of John Doe's identifying information).
214
See, e.g., Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865PSG, 2011WL3100404, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (acknowledging, but declining to follow, some courts' practice of deferring the question of joinder until after
plaintiffs to take leave for discovery).
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der appropriate. 201 Courts have noted that the P2P networks at issue in
previous P2P file sharing cases were of precisely the same P2P architecture as BitTorrent. 202 Therefore, allegations that defendants participated in a single BitTorrent swarm, usually on different days and at
different times, are insufficient to make a valid claim of concerted
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207
the plaintiff secures information identifying the Does." Generally,
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Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (holding that addressing unique defenses raised by each defendant would result in mini-trials with different witnesses and evidence).
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See Dickman, supra note 23, at 1111 (theorizing that plaintiffs should have
to cure procedural defects before continuing lawsuit).

MASS FILE SHARING LAWSUITS

361

propriety of j oinder will never be addressed if courts defer that issue
until after identification. 209
[Copyright holders'] motive for seekingjoinder ... is to keep
[their] own litigation costs down in hopes that defendants will
accept a low initial settlement demand. However, filing one
mass action in order to identify hundreds of doe defendants
through pre-service discovery and facilitate mass settlement, is
not what the joinder rules were established for. 210
Courts tasked with adjudicating John Doe file sharing cases seem to
be trending towards findingjoinder inappropriate and severing defendants prior to identification of the John Doe defendants. 211 While some
courts defer deciding on the issue of j oinder until after the Does have
been identified, at least one commentator has observed that the identifying information of each defendant is oflittle to no use in assessingjoin212
der. Determining whether a copyright holder's claims against multiple
defendants arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences can be evaluated based on information already known to copyright holders at the time of filing suit. 213
Courts adjudicating John Doe file sharing cases seem to be trending
toward findingj oinder inappropriate and severing anonymous defendants
prior to identification. 214 This protects defendants' identifying information, which may prevent copyright holders from distributing settle-

209

See id. (suggesting thatjoinder will not be addressed because defendants
do not choose to proceed to trial and argue their defenses).
210
JO Group, 2011WL445043, at *6.
211
See, e.g., Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865PSG 2011WL3100404, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (acknowledging that some
courts have deferred the question of joinder until after allowing plaintiff to take leave
for discovery but declining to follow such precedent).
212
See Dickman, supra note 208, at 1114 (suggesting that question ofmisjoinder should be decided at pleading level). But see Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does
1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011WL1807438, at *5 (D.D.C. 2011) (inquiring as to
propriety of joinder without John Doe defendants' identifying information).213 See
id. (noting plaintiff would know whether one defendant downloaded copyrighted
work from another defendant based on observing file sharing activity, regardless of
John Doe's identifying information).
213 See id. (noting plaintiff would know whether one defendant downloaded copyrighted work from another defendant based on observing file sharing activity, regardless of John Doe's identifying information).
214
See, e.g., Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, No. 10-CV-5865PSG, 2011 WL 3100404, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (acknowledging, but declining to follow, some courts' practice of deferring the question of joinder until after
plaintiffs to take leave for discovery).

MASS FILE SHARING LAWSUITS
362

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

[Vol. 3:2]

ment letters to innocent or otherwise incorrectly named defendants. 215 Jn
Gillespie v. Civiletti, the Ninth Circuit recognized an exception to the
general allowance of discovery of anonymous users' identifying infor216
mation. Gillespie held that where the identities of putative defendants
are unknown at the time of filing the complaint, the plaintiffs should be
provided an opportunity to discover defendants' identities, unless one of
217
two conditions applies. The first is where discovery would not reveal
the identities of the unknown defendants, and the second-more important in this context-is where the claim against the defendant could
218
be dismissed. At least one court has held that the second Gillespie
condition is not satisfied, and discovery should be disallowed, where the
defendants are improperly joined. 219
These conditions are imposed so that "[p]eople who have committed
no wrong . . . can participate online without fear that someone who
wishes to harass or embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and
thereby gain the power of the court's order to discover their identity. " 220
This sentiment is particularly applicable for innocent John Doe defendants who would likely face a settlement letter if courts allowed discovery
of their identities. 221
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spread acceptance. 223 Meanwhile, mass file sharing lawsuits against John
Does continue to proliferate, affecting the lives of over 200,000 individ224
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Resolution of mass file sharing lawsuits hinges primarily upon the
way in which district court judges address the procedural issues raised in
these cases. 225 Voltage Pictures and Nu Image best exemplify the significant ramifications of judges' differing resolutions of procedural issues
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raised by John Doe file sharing lawsuits.2 In Voltage Pictures, the court
allowed j oinder of 5000 defendants and deferred ruling on personal jurisdiction until after the John Doe defendants were identified, allowing
the release of identifying information and distribution of settlement letters to all defendants.227 Conversely, the court in Nu Image disallowed
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copyright holders could not show a good faith belief
that the court would
28
have personal jurisdiction over the defendants.2 The decision to limit
suit and aldiscovery in Nu Image led the copyright holder to drop the229
lowed all 23,322 defendants to walk away free ofliability.
While copyright holders need a way to protect their works from infringement, using mass file sharing lawsuits as a remedy threatens to
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See Steven Masur, Collective Rights Licensing for Internet Downloads and
223
Streams: Would it Properly Compensate Rights Holders?, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 39, 40 (2011) (advocating collective rights licensing at the ISP level to curb tide
of illegal file sharing and similar forms of piracy, and also providing compensation
for copyright holders). See Colin E. Shanahan, ACTA Fool or: How Rights Holders
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 512 's Subpoena Provisions, 15 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 465, 477 (2011) (discussing the negotiation of the ACTA treaty and the
proposal to expand DMCA section 512(h) subpoena to cover P2P file- sharing users
engaged in P2P file sharing).
See 200,000 BitTorrent Users Sued in the United States, ToRRENTFREAK
224
(Aug. 8, 2011 ), http://torrentfreak.com/200000-bittorrent-users-sued-in-the-unitedstates-1l0808/ (reporting that over 200,000 BitTorrent John Does have been sued
since 2010).
225 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of the significance of courts' resolution of procedural
226
issues in file sharing lawsuits, see infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
227 See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, No. 10-0873 (BAH), 2011 WL
1807438, at *10 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011).
See Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C.
228
2011) (limiting plaintiffs discovery request to IP addresses the plaintiff has a good
faith belief will correspond with the defendants located in the District of Columbia).
See The Expendables Makers Dismiss Massive BitTorrent Lawsuit,
229
ToRRENTFREAK (Aug. 25, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/the-expendables-makersdismiss-massive-bittorrent-lawsuit-l l 0825/ (revealing that Nu Image dropped its suit
against all defendants upon court's refusal to grant jurisdictional discovery).
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230

selves. The overarching concern is that the expense of litigation and
potential for extremely high awards of damages serve as strong incentive
for named defendants to accept settlement letters, irrespective of their
231
guilt or innocence. In one of the only file sharing cases to proceed to
litigation, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, a $1,920,000 verdict
rendered against a defendant who shared twenty-four copyrighted songs
using a P2P network, subsequently remitted to $54,000. 232
Given the incentive to settle, once defendants' identifying information is released to the copyright holders, the settlement letters are
served and defendants overwhelmingly choose to accept the offers. 233
Allowing discovery of defendants' identifying information and deferring
issues ofjoinder and personal jurisdiction deprives defendants of an opportunity to dispute these matters. 234 Findingjoinder of defendants improper helps to prevent copyright holders' goals of mass settlements and
accords with previous P2P file sharing cases. 235

NOTE OF THE YEAR
IS WIKILEAKS A HIT MAN
HANDBOOK?:
WHY WIKILEAKS CANNOT CLAIM
FIRST AMENDMENT IMMUNITY IF
THE AFGHAN AND IRAQ WAR LOGS
CAUSE PHYSICAL HARM
Rachel Wolbers*
"President Obama supports responsible, accountable and open
government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal. By releasing stolen and classified documents, WikiLeaks has put at risk not only the cause of hu1
man rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. "
INTRODUCTION

230

See Julianne Pepitone, 50,000 BitTorrent Users Sued for Alleged Illegal
Downloads, CNN MONEY (June 10, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011 /06/1 O/technology/bittorrent_lawsuits/index.htm (collecting views of critics who say Voltage's suit is exploitative of copyright law, and referring to litigation as employing "pay up or we'll getcha" method).
231
See Dickman, supra note 23, at 1111 (indicating that file-sharers' lawsuits
typically proceed no further than the release of the defendants' identifying information and subsequent distribution of settlement letters); s.ee supra notes 9-12 and
accompanying text.
232
680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010) (remitting damages rendered
against P2P file-sharer to $2250 per infringed work, three times the statutory minimum).
233
See Dickman, supra note 23, at 1111 (2008) (indicating that file sharers
lawsuits typically proceed no further than release of defendants' identifying information and subsequent distribution of settlement letters).
234
See id. (asserting that courts may never resolve procedural questions since
defendants were unlikely to proceed to trial).
235
See supra Part N.C for a discussion of why joinder should be found improper.

On July 25, 2010 WikiLeaks.org ("WikiLeaks") released ab:_n~st
70 000 classified U.S. military documents on to its website, detailing
~erican operations in Afghanistan (the "Afghan War. Logs"). 2
While the Afghan War Logs comprised only a small port10n of the
documents released on WikiLeaks during 2010, this leak alone con3
tained the names and addresses of over 117 informants. A hypothetical cable from the Afghan War Logs would read:
* J.D. candidate, May 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, awarded Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet Note of the Year, as selected by the Volume 2 Editorial Board.
1 Press Release, White House, Statement of the Press Secretary, Nov. 28,
201 o at http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/28/statement-press-secretary.
2 C.J. Chivers et al., The Afghan Struggle: A Secret Archive and an Unvar'
nished Look at a Hamstrung Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at Al.
3 Larry Love, Here are the Details of Wikileaks Informants, ABOVE TOP
SECRET (Jun. 30, 2010, 2:08 PM),
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread598661/pg1.
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